Reference health

The Economics of Supranational Bank Supervision

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3130124
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33/33 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

12 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 33 checked references that resolve
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Does Macro‐Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment
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On US politics and IMF lending
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How does competition affect bank systemic risk?
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Competition among regulators and credit market integration☆
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Bank activity and funding strategies: The impact on risk and returns☆
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The spillovers, interactions, and (un)intended consequences of monetary and regulatory policies
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Cheap Credit, Lending Operations, and International Politics: The Case of Global Microfinance
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The behaviour of the maximum likelihood estimator of limited dependent variable models in the presence of fixed effects
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What lies beneath the euro's effect on financial integration? Currency risk, legal harmonization, or trade?
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The duration of bank relationships
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“When the cat's away the mice will play”: Does regulation at home affect bank risk-taking abroad?
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Tau-b or Not Tau-b: Measuring the Similarity of Foreign Policy Positions
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The 12 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedBank Supervision Going Global? A Cost-Benefit Analysis
no DOI — not checkedSupranational Supervision: How Much and for Whom?
no DOI — not checkedReport on the supervision of banks' foreign establishments -Concordat
no DOI — not checkedPrinciples for the supervision of banks' foreign establishments
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedCrisis Management in Europe
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedFiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Boarder Banking Crisis
no DOI — not checkedOptimum Currency Area
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref45
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