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The Implementation Duality

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3155345
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The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedt(x ?)) hold for all x, x ? ? X. Similarly, letting R Y be the set of functions from Y to R, we may define (v, x) ? R Y � X Y to be implementable by an incentive compatible direct mechanism if there exists t ? R Y such that v(y) = ?(y, x(y), t(y)) and ?(y, x(y), t(y)) ? ?(y, x(y ?), t(y ?)) hold for all
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no DOI — not checkedOptimal Deterministic Contracting Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
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