At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in
Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the
registry record that put it there.
The 57 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0007On the Existence of Optimal Contract Mechanisms for Incomplete Information Principal-Agent Models
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2928876Yogurts Choose Consumers? Identification of Random Utility Models via Two-Sided Matching
resolves10.1007/s00199-009-0455-zHedonic price equilibria, stable matching, and optimal transport: equivalence, topology, and uniqueness
resolves10.2307/1912658The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2535394An Empirical Framework for Matching with Imperfectly Transferable Utility
resolves10.1086/296460Insider Trading, Liquidity, and the Role of the Monopolist Specialist
resolves10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4A complete solution to a class of principal-agent problems with an application to the control of a self-managed firm
resolves10.1006/jeth.1993.1008Existence and Characterization of Optimal Employment Contracts on a Continuous State Space
resolves10.1016/0306-3623(94)90069-8Opioids I. 815pp. 1993. Springer Verlag, Berlin. DM 580. and Opioids II. 840pp. 1993. Springer Verlag, Berlin. DM 580
resolves10.1002/cpa.21817On Concavity of the Monopolist's Problem Facing Consumers with Nonlinear Price Preferences
resolves10.2307/2296779An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
resolves10.2307/2296899Monopoly, Non-Linear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market
The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedt(x ?)) hold for all x, x ? ? X. Similarly, letting R Y be the set of functions from Y to R, we may define (v, x) ? R Y � X Y to be implementable by an incentive compatible direct mechanism if there exists t ? R Y such that v(y) = ?(y, x(y), t(y)) and ?(y, x(y), t(y)) ? ?(y, x(y ?), t(y ?)) hold for all
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedDuality and Existence for a Class of Mass Transportation Problems and Economic Applications
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedPairwise Stable Matching in Large Economies
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedref53
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Deterministic Contracting Mechanisms for Principal-Agent Problems with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
no DOI — not checkedref65
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