Reference health
Liquidity Shocks, Market Discipline and Liquidity Risk: Evidence from the Interbank Market
46/46 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 46 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jmacro.2012.06.004
The effectiveness of monetary policy in steering money market rates during the financial crisis
resolves10.1016/j.jimonfin.2017.02.008
Spillovers of U.S. unconventional monetary policy to emerging markets: The role of capital flows
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00402.x
The Interbank Market after August 2007: What Has Changed, and Why?
resolves10.3386/w16395
Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and Inter-Bank Markets: Evidence from the Sub-prime Crisis
resolves10.1257/mac.4.2.184
Imperfect Competition in the Interbank Market for Liquidity as a Rationale for Central Banking
resolves10.1086/296475
Bank Size, Collateral, and Net Purchase Behavior in the Federal Funds Market: Empirical Evidence
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2358396
Central Bank Refinancing, Interbank Markets, and the Hypothesis of Liquidity Hoarding: Evidence from a Euro-Area Banking System
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2013.02.008
How does capital affect bank performance during financial crises?
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2013.02.002
Do we need big banks? Evidence on performance, strategy and market discipline
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01274.x
Episodic Liquidity Crises: Cooperative and Predatory Trading
resolves10.1111/jmcb.12088
Too Big to Be Efficient? The Impact of Implicit Subsidies on Estimates of Scale Economies for Banks
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.10.010
Are banks too big to fail or too big to save? International evidence from equity prices and CDS spreads
resolves10.2307/2601198
Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.05.015
The price of liquidity: The effects of market conditions and bank characteristics
resolves10.1086/209662
Banks as Monitors of Other Banks: Evidence from the Overnight Federal Funds Market
resolves10.1016/j.ememar.2015.07.002
Tapering talk: The impact of expectations of reduced Federal Reserve security purchases on emerging markets
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2015.07.002
Liquidity hoarding and interbank market rates: The role of counterparty risk
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2016.10.008
Identifying central bank liquidity super-spreaders in interbank funds networks
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2671045
The International Bank Lending Channel of Monetary Policy Rates and QE: Credit Supply, Reach-for-Yield, and Real Effects
resolves10.1016/j.ememar.2017.05.007
The influence of risk-taking on bank efficiency: Evidence from Colombia
resolves10.1016/j.ribaf.2016.12.007
An early warning indicator system to monitor the unsecured interbank funds market
resolves10.1353/mcb.2003.0022
Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues
resolves10.1016/j.jimonfin.2015.12.010
Unconventional monetary policy and the spillovers to emerging markets
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedHow stressed are banks in the interbank market?
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedMarket Discipline in Banking
no DOI — not checkedBasel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
no DOI — not checkedBasel III: The liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity risk monitoring tools, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Bank for International Settlements
no DOI — not checkedRelationship lending in the interbank market and the price of liquidity
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedref48
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
Embed this badge
Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.
<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3164584"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3164584/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3164584)