Reference health

Do Agency Contracts Facilitate Upstream Collusion?

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3174264
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17/17 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 17 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(86)90025-6
Extremal equilibria of oligopolistic supergames
resolves10.2307/2555414
Common Marketing Agency as a Device for Facilitating Collusion
resolves10.1086/686971
The Effects of Platform Most-Favored-Nation Clauses on Competition and Entry
resolves10.1287/mksc.10.4.271
Price Competition in a Channel Structure with a Common Retailer
resolves10.2307/2555718
Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Tacit Collusion
resolves10.1111/j.1430-9134.1996.00317.x
P<scp>roduct</scp> R<scp>ange and</scp> I<scp>nterfirm</scp> C<scp>ompetition</scp>
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12195
Apple's agency model and the role of most‐favored‐nation clauses
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2352495
On the Antitrust Economics of the Electronic Books Industry
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12271
When is upstream collusion profitable?
resolves10.1093/restud/rdx007
The Agency Model and MFN Clauses
resolves10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00122.x
Resale price maintenance and collusion
resolves10.1007/bf01232420
Optimal punishments in linear duopoly supergames with product differentiation
resolves10.1007/s11151-017-9583-y
A Comparison of the Wholesale Model and the Agency Model in Differentiated Markets
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3099305
Platform Most-Favored-Customer Clauses and Investment Incentives
resolves10.2307/2555957
Bilateral Most-Favored-Customer Pricing and Collusion
resolves10.1257/aer.97.4.1321
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?
resolves10.1111/jems.12209
Manufacturer collusion: Strategic implications of the channel structure
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedPlatform price parity clauses with direct sales
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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