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Fear, Deposit Insurance Schemes, and Deposit Reallocation in the German Banking System

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3180107
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16/16 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

5 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 16 checked references that resolve
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A Crisis of Banks as Liquidity Providers
resolves10.2307/3502804
L'euro et la stabilité des taux de change. Une analyse théorique
resolves10.1007/s10693-014-0205-7
Do Depositors Discipline Banks and Did Government Actions During the Recent Crisis Reduce this Discipline? An International Perspective
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2009.11.007
Deposit insurance and money market freezes
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.06.007
Interbank networks in the National Banking Era: Their purpose and their role in the Panic of 1893
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhu072
The Sum of All FEARS Investor Sentiment and Asset Prices
resolves10.3386/w9956
Banks' Advantage in Hedging Liquidity Risk: Theory and Evidence from the Commercial Paper Market
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2889304
Public Bank Guarantees and Allocative Efficiency
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhq114
Competition, Risk-shifting, and Public Bail-out Policies
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00566.x
Deposit Insurance, Banking Crises, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows and Rates
resolves10.1111/1540-6261.00415
Banks as Liquidity Providers: An Explanation for the Coexistence of Lending and Deposit‐taking
resolves10.3386/w24589
Deposit Inflows and Outflows in Failing Banks: The Role of Deposit Insurance
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00354
Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises
resolves10.1006/jfin.1996.0010
Competition for Deposits, Fragility, and Insurance
resolves10.1016/s0014-2921(98)00057-9
Imperfect competition, risk taking, and regulation in banking
resolves10.1016/j.jmoneco.2005.10.007
Deposit insurance, bank regulation, and financial system risks
The 5 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedReconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to euro area reform
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedProposal for amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedref12
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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