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Investment Bank Monitoring and Bonding of Security Analysts’ Research

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3223868
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAuditor reputation and the pricing of initial public offerings
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref46
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