Reference health

Unobserved Heterogeneity in Auctions

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3236848
CiteStamped reference-health badge
34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 34 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2010.02.002
Estimating first-price auctions with an unknown number of bidders: A misclassification approach
resolves10.1093/qje/qjq001
Comparing open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Timber Auctions*
resolves10.1093/restud/rdq001
Semiparametric Estimation of First-Price Auctions with Risk-Averse Bidders
resolves10.1002/jae.697
Asymmetry in first‐price auctions with affiliated private values
resolves10.3386/w15158
The 2007 Subprime Market Crisis Through the Lens of European Central Bank Auctions for Short-Term Funds
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00454
Identification in Nonseparable Models
resolves10.1111/ectj.12068
Using Mixtures in Econometric Models: A Brief Review and Some New Results
resolves10.1017/s0266466611000831
SOME EXTENSIONS OF A LEMMA OF KOTLARSKI
resolves10.3982/ecta10293
Identification in Auctions With Selective Entry
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1337843
Identification and Estimation of Level-K Auctions
resolves10.2307/3003578
The Competitive Effect in Bonus Bidding: New Evidence
resolves10.3982/ecta7028
Nonparametric Identification of Risk Aversion in First-Price Auctions Under Exclusion Restrictions
resolves10.1257/aer.91.3.399
Auctions with Resale Markets: An Application to U.S. Forest Service Timber Sales
resolves10.3386/w10105
Nonparametric Tests for Common Values at First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions
resolves10.2307/136037
A Survey of Recent Empirical Work concerning Auctions
resolves10.1111/1467-937x.00239
Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions
resolves10.1016/s1573-448x(06)03032-9
Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions
resolves10.1515/2156-6674.1019
Structural Econometric Methods in Auctions: A Guide to the Literature
resolves10.1257/aer.20160675
Bid Shading and Bidder Surplus in the US Treasury Auction System
resolves10.1086/657948
Mechanism Choice and Strategic Bidding in Divisible Good Auctions: An Empirical Analysis of the Turkish Treasury Auction Market
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.12.001
Identification and estimation of nonlinear models with misclassification error using instrumental variables: A general solution
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2013.02.005
Identification of first-price auctions with non-separable unobserved heterogeneity
resolves10.3982/ecta7108
Identification and Estimation of Triangular Simultaneous Equations Models Without Additivity
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00455
Estimation of a Dynamic Auction Game
resolves10.1093/restud/rdq024
Discrete Bids and Empirical Inference in Divisible Good Auctions
resolves10.2140/pjm.1967.20.69
On characterizing the gamma and the normal distribution
resolves10.1093/restud/rdq004
Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
resolves10.1257/aer.101.6.2653
Bid Preference Programs and Participation in Highway Procurement Auctions
resolves10.1016/0014-2921(93)90022-3
Structural econometric analysis of descending auctions
resolves10.1016/s0304-4076(99)00081-0
Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00452
Nonparametric Estimation of Nonadditive Random Functions
resolves10.2307/1911865
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
resolves10.2307/2171831
The Dynamics of Productivity in the Telecommunications Equipment Industry
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12038
Unobserved heterogeneity and reserve prices in auctions
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedIdentification of Standard Auction Models
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedCommon Values, Unobserverd Heterogeneity, and Endogenous Entry in U.S. Offshore Oil Lease Auctions
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedSelective Entry in Auctions: Estimation and Evidence
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedref42
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3236848"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3236848/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3236848/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3236848)