Reference health

Agency in Intangibles

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3242478
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65/65 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

30 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 65 checked references that resolve
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Agency Conflicts, Investment, and Asset Pricing
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The Stock Market and Capital Accumulation
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Optimal Executive Compensation when Firm Size Follows Geometric Brownian Motion
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The 30 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedA Unified Model of Firm Dynamics with Limited Commitment and Assortative Matching
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedAgency Frictions, Managerial Compensation, and Disruptive Innovations
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedA Theory of Financing Constraints and Firm Dynamics
no DOI — not checkedExecutive Compensation: Facts
no DOI — not checkedFrom Good to Bad Concentration? US Industries over the Past 30 Years
no DOI — not checkedRents and Intangible Capital: A Q+ Framework
no DOI — not checkedIntegrating Profitability Prospeects and Cash Management
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model
no DOI — not checkedLeverage Dynamics without Commitment
no DOI — not checkedA Multiplicative Model of Optimal CEO Incentives in Market Equilibrium
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedref50
no DOI — not checkedInvestment-less Growth: An Empirical Investigation
no DOI — not checkedref53
no DOI — not checkedMultitask Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design
no DOI — not checkedAgency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers
no DOI — not checkedref62
no DOI — not checkedThe Valuation of Organization Capital
no DOI — not checkedref71
no DOI — not checkedAgency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model
no DOI — not checkedCollateral, Risk Management, and the Distribution of Debt Capacity
no DOI — not checkedDiscussion of Summers
no DOI — not checkedref91
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