Reference health
Debt Holder Monitoring and Implicit Guarantees: Did the BRRD Improve Market Discipline?
39/39 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-21
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
11 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 39 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2006.06.001
Too many to fail—An analysis of time-inconsistency in bank closure policies
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2349739
Fallacies, Irrelevant Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is Not Socially Expensive
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2007.05.003
Does the market discipline banks? New evidence from regulatory capital mix
resolves10.1086/344122
Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing
resolves10.1023/a:1022021430852
Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing
resolves10.1257/aer.90.5.1397
Minimum Wages and Employment: A Case Study of the Fast-Food Industry in New Jersey and Pennsylvania: Reply
resolves10.1016/j.jfi.2016.10.003
The real effects of banking supervision: Evidence from enforcement actions
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2012.09.003
A theory of failed bank resolution: Technological change and political economics
resolves10.1016/j.frl.2016.04.008
Determinants of non-performing loans: Evidence from Euro-area countries
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.03.005
Safer ratios, riskier portfolios: Banks׳ response to government aid
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1996.tb04072.x
Evidence of Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983–1991
resolves10.1016/s0304-405x(01)00096-4
Depositor discipline and changing strategies for regulating thrift institutions
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2009.05.006
Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.03.029
Monitoring the “invisible” hand of market discipline: Capital adequacy revisited
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.10.003
Bank rescues and bailout expectations: The erosion of market discipline during the financial crisis
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2017.12.001
The systemic implications of bail-in: A multi-layered network approach
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2014.05.002
Wishful thinking or effective threat? Tightening bank resolution regimes and bank risk-taking
resolves10.1111/1475-6803.00037
The Effect of Credit Risk on Bank and Bank Holding Company Bond Yields: Evidence from the Post‐FDICIA Period
resolves10.1257/aer.20120389
Too-Systemic-to-Fail: What Option Markets Imply about Sector-Wide Government Guarantees
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00797.x
Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity? New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00354
Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2017.11.005
To be bailed out or to be left to fail? A dynamic competing risks hazard analysis
resolves10.1353/mcb.2003.0022
Testing for Market Discipline in the European Banking Industry: Evidence from Subordinated Debt Issues
resolves10.1093/jfr/fjy002
Too Complex to Work: A Critical Assessment of the Bail-in Tool under the European Bank Recovery and Resolution Regime
The 11 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedMostly harmless econometrics: An empiricist's companion / Joshua D. Angrist & J�rn-Steffen Pischke. Princeton
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedDeposit Insurance, Risk, and Market Power in Banking
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedref44
no DOI — not checkedImplicit guarantees for bank debt: where do we stand?
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedref50
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