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Grand Challenges in Social Physics: In Pursuit of Moral Behavior

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3264767
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedMoral conflict and political legitimacy
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