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Contagion of Pro- and Anti-Social Behavior Among Peers and the Role of Social Proximity

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3286770
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

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