Reference health

Ownership Networks and Bid Rigging

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3298152
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29/29 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

18 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 29 checked references that resolve
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Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals
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A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel
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resolves10.1023/A:1010933404324
Random Forests
resolves10.1016/0167-7187(86)90028-7
Quantifying the competitive effects of production joint ventures
resolves10.2307/3003203
Identical Bids and Cartel Behavior
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Why do corporate managers misstate financial statements? The role of option compensation and other factors
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Friends with money
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.010
Numerical simulations of asymmetric first-price auctions
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12213
Knowledge transfer and partial equity ownership
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.08.008
Institutional cross-holdings and their effect on acquisition decisions
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhx028
Product Market Competition in a World of Cross-Ownership: Evidence from Institutional Blockholdings
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019
Internalizing governance externalities: The role of institutional cross-ownership
resolves10.1002/jae.2385
Replacing Sample Trimming with Boundary Correction in Nonparametric Estimation of First‐Price Auctions
resolves10.1016/B978-0-444-52980-0.00002-5
On the Numerical Solution of Equilibria in Auction Models with Asymmetries within the Private-Values Paradigm
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhu062
Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.02.007
Acquirer-target social ties and merger outcomes
resolves10.1111/jofi.12243
CEO Connectedness and Corporate Fraud
resolves10.1057/palgrave.emr.1500043
Corporate ownership structure and performance in Europe
resolves10.1093/restud/rdq004
Identification and Estimation of Auction Models with Unobserved Heterogeneity
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00115
Corporate Ownership Around the World
resolves10.1257/002205106776162681
What Determines Cartel Success?
resolves10.1016/S0304-4076(99)00081-0
Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.11.004
Cross-ownership, returns, and voting in mergers☆
resolves10.26845/KJFS.2019.10.48.5.617
Common Ownership and Product Market Competition: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00136
A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
resolves10.1086/261885
Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions
resolves10.1016/0167-7187(86)90027-5
The competitive effects of partial equity interests and joint ventures
resolves10.1109/ICDM.2019.00184
On the Robust Splitting Criterion of Random Forest
The 18 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedAnti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership
no DOI — not checkedCommon Ownership and Competition in the Ready-To-Eat Cereal Industry
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref12
no DOI — not checkedMergers in symmetric and asymmetric noncooperative auction markets: the effects on prices and efficiency
no DOI — not checkedOn the robustness of decision tree learning under label noise
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedThe Strategies of Anticompetitive Common Ownership
no DOI — not checkedMere common ownership and the antitrust laws
no DOI — not checkedDoes common ownership really increase firm coordination
no DOI — not checkedAffiliation and entry in first-price auctions with heterogeneous bidders: An analysis of merger effects
no DOI — not checkedBidding rings
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedCommon ownership and executive incentives: The implausibility of compensation as an anticompetitive mechanism
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