Reference health
US State Constitutional Entrenchment and Default in the Nineteenth Century
66/66 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 66 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2477525
Do Markets Reward Constitutional Reform? Lessons from America’s State Debt Crisis
resolves10.1016/s0047-2727(00)00150-x
Legislative organization and government spending: cross-country evidence
resolves10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2007.04.002
From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments
resolves10.1007/s10602-011-9114-z
Credible commitments and constitutional constraints: state debt repudiation and default in nineteenth century America
resolves10.1017/s1744137413000234
Financial markets, fiscal constraints, and municipal debt: lessons and evidence from the panic of 1873
resolves10.1007/s10101-015-0172-y
Do fiscal constraints prevent default? Historical evidence from U.S. municipalities
resolves10.1016/j.jce.2018.04.003
It's easier to contract than to pay: Judicial independence and US municipal default in the 19th century
resolves10.1177/003232928201100409
Jon Elster. Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds. Chichester and New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1978. Idem. Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality. Cambridge and London: Cambridge University Press, 1979
resolves10.1093/icon/mov041
Does the constitutional amendment rule matter at all?: Amendment cultures and the challenges of measuring amendment difficulty
resolves10.2307/2586116
Was James Madison Wrong? Rethinking the American Preference for Short, Framework-Oriented Constitutions
resolves10.1017/s1744137416000266
1688 and all that: property rights, the Glorious Revolution and the rise of British capitalism
resolves10.1177/0275074016657180
The Impact of Tax and Expenditure Limits on Municipal Credit Ratings
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewr017
Self-Enforcing Constitutions: With an Application to Democratic Stability In America's First Century
resolves10.1017/s0022050700009451
Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England
resolves10.2307/3310711
State Constitutional Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach
resolves10.1023/A:1026112530744
Democracy, Government Spending, and Economic Growth: A Political-Economic Explanation of the Barro-Effect
resolves10.1093/jleo/18.1.155
Credible Commitment in Early Modern Europe: North and Weingast Revisited
resolves10.1111/1475-6765.12206
The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world
resolves10.1017/s0007123414000441
A Long Constitution is a (Positively) Bad Constitution: Evidence from OECD Countries
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Constitutions Unentrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design
resolves10.1007/s11127-010-9638-1
Positive constitutional economics II—a survey of recent developments
resolves10.1017/s0022050705050084
Constitutions, Corporations, and Corruption: American States and Constitutional Change, 1842 to 1852
resolves10.3386/w10753
Sovereign Debt and Repudiation: The Emerging-Market Debt Crisis in the U.S. States, 1839-1843
resolves10.1017/cbo9780511511462.019
Dysfunctional or Optimal Institutions? State Debt Limitations, the Structure of State and Local Governments, and the Finance of American Infrastructure
resolves10.1093/oxfordjournals.jleo.a036861
The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-Preserving Federalism and Economic Development
The 17 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedConstitutional Amendment Methods in the Democracies of the World
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no DOI — not checkedTime Consistency and Policy
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no DOI — not checkedConstitutional Specificity, Unwritten Understandings and Constitutional Agreement
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no DOI — not checkedref67
no DOI — not checkedThe Annals of the United States of America
no DOI — not checkedConstitutions as Governance Structures: The Political Foundations of Secure Markets
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