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Why Companies Are So Different?: Empirical Evidence on Corporate Governance and Financial Design of US Public Companies

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3301829
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4 of 60 checkable references need attention · checked 2026-08-28

At the dated check, the references listed below either did not resolve in Crossref or DataCite, or carried a retraction notice. Each one is shown with the registry record that put it there.

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