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Fiscal Rules and Discretion Under Limited Enforcement

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3312974
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 47 checked references that resolve
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The Optimal Degree of Discretion in Monetary Policy
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Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets*
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The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedOn the Theory of Delegation
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no DOI — not checkedref50
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