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A Strategy-Proof Mechanism Should Be Announced to Be Strategy-Proof: An Experiment for the Vickrey Auction

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3324776
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The 34 checked references that resolve
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An experimental examination of demand reduction in multi‐unit versions of the Uniform‐price, Vickrey, and English auctions
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