Reference health

Belief Polarization and Investment

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3341017
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58/58 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-15

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

10 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 58 checked references that resolve
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Deliberating Collective Decisions
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A Theory of Corporate Boards and Forced CEO Turnover
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Financial Policies and Internal Governance with Heterogeneous Risk Preferences
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Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective
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Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses
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RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND DIVERGENCE OF OPINION
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The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing
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Board effectiveness and board dissent: A model of the board's relationship to management and shareholders
The 10 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedCorporate governance: Voting rights and majority rules
no DOI — not checkedThe new vote buying: Empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership
no DOI — not checkedCollective dynamic choice: the necessity of time inconsistency
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedMarket for votes
no DOI — not checkedWhen Shareholders Disagree: Trading after Shareholder Meetings
no DOI — not checkedref57
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