Reference health
Sourcing Contract Under Countervailing Incentives
36/36 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
6 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 36 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1023/b:rege.0000028011.71612.70
Toward a Synthesis of Models of Regulatory Policy Design with Limited Information
resolves10.1006/jeth.1993.1071
Principals Competing for an Agent in the Presence of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
resolves10.1287/msom.2017.0628
Simple Contracts to Assure Supply Under Noncontractible Capacity and Asymmetric Cost Information
resolves10.1287/mnsc.46.8.1032.12029
Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information
resolves10.1287/mnsc.47.5.629.10486
Contracting to Assure Supply: How to Share Demand Forecasts in a Supply Chain
resolves10.1111/j.1937-5956.2011.01258.x
Contracting and Coordination under Asymmetric Production Cost Information
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2193
Provision of Incentives for Information Acquisition: Forecast-Based Contracts vs. Menus of Linear Contracts
resolves10.1007/978-1-4615-4949-9_9
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
resolves10.1287/opre.49.4.487.11223
Stochastic Inventory Systems in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information: Cycle Stocks, Safety Stocks, and Consignment Stock
resolves10.1287/mnsc.46.3.444.12065
A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2014.1938
Dynamic Bargaining in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Information
resolves10.1002/1520-6750(200102)48:1<41::aid-nav3>3.0.co;2-m
Supplier-buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1120.1523
Supply Chain Performance Under Market Valuation: An Operational Approach to Restore Efficiency
resolves10.1287/opre.2017.1626
Technical Note—Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1120.1581
Mechanism Design for Capacity Planning Under Dynamic Evolutions of Asymmetric Demand Forecasts
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1060.0521
Strategic Commitments for an Optimal Capacity Decision Under Asymmetric Forecast Information
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1100.1204
Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?
resolves10.1287/msom.1090.0287
Procurement Mechanism Design in a Two-Echelon Inventory System with Price-Sensitive Demand
The 6 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedOn precommitment effects between competing agencies
no DOI — not checkedCompetition in non-linear tariff
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedOptimal bypass and cream skimming
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedOligopoly and product quality
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