Reference health

Electoral Institutions with Impressionable Voters

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3396177
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42/42 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-04

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 42 checked references that resolve
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The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedBlind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Droughts, Flu, and Shark Attacks
no DOI — not checkedMusical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability
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no DOI — not checkedOpinion and Action in the Realm of Politics
no DOI — not checkedA Mathematical Proof of Duverger's Law
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What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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