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When "Signals" Boomerang: Employers' Reactions to a Novel Signaling Mechanism
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Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
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The 89 checked references that resolve
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Understanding the relationship between founder–CEOs and firm performance
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Design Crowdsourcing: The Impact on New Product Performance of Sourcing Design Solutions from the “Crowd”
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Steering in Online Markets: The Role of Platform Incentives and Credibility
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A Consumer-Side Experimental Examination of Signaling Theory: Do Consumers Perceive Warranties as Signals of Quality?
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2015.2231
Coordinating Complex Work: Knowledge Networks, Partner Departures, and Client Relationship Performance in a Law Firm
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Consumer Surplus in the Digital Economy: Estimating the Value of Increased Product Variety at Online Booksellers
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He’s Overqualified, She’s Highly Committed: Qualification Signals and Gendered Assumptions About Job Candidate Commitment
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2756
Hiring Preferences in Online Labor Markets: Evidence of a Female Hiring Bias
resolves10.1016/j.jom.2006.11.002
A history of research in service operations: What's the
<i>big idea</i>
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Is the World Really Flat? A Look at Offshoring at an Online Programming Marketplace1
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When Does It (Not) Pay to Be Good? Interplay Between Stakeholder and Competitive Strategies
resolves10.1287/isre.2017.0709
On Buyer Selection of Service Providers in Online Outsourcing Platforms for IT Services
resolves10.1287/isre.2021.1003
Just DM Me (Politely): Direct Messaging, Politeness, and Hiring Outcomes in Online Labor Markets
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2005.08.024
Results on the bias and inconsistency of ordinary least squares for the linear probability model
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Advertising Spending and Quality for Services: The Role of Capacity
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2018.3116
Buyer Uncertainty About Seller Capacity: Causes, Consequences, and a Partial Solution
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Unemployment and Worker Participation in the Gig Economy: Evidence from an Online Labor Market
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Surviving in Global Online Labor Markets for IT Services: A Geo-Economic Analysis
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Dynamic, Multidimensional, and Skillset-Specific Reputation Systems for Online Work
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Adjusting Skillset Cohesion in Online Labor Markets: Reputation Gains and Opportunity Losses
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2871
Learning to Hire? Hiring as a Dynamic Experiential Learning Process in an Online Market for Contract Labor
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2016.2594
Effectiveness of Reputation in Contracting for Customized Production: Evidence from Online Labor Markets
resolves10.1287/mksc.14.4.442
Signaling Quality with a Money-Back Guarantee: The Role of Transaction Costs
resolves10.1287/isre.2014.0549
Doing Business with Strangers: Reputation in Online Service Marketplaces
resolves10.1287/isre.2013.0489
<b>Research Note</b>—The Value of Third-Party Assurance Seals in Online Retailing: An Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1050.0381
The Making of a “Hot Product”: A Signaling Explanation of Marketers’ Scarcity Strategy
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2022.4329
Competition, Contracts, and Creativity: Evidence from Novel Writing in a Platform Market
resolves10.1287/isre.2022.1162
Platform Refund Insurance or Being Cast Out: Quantifying the Signaling Effect of Refund Options in the Online Service Marketplace
resolves10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00124.x
A model of mixed signals with applications to countersignalling
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Reputation Effects and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian Software Industry*
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Can Reputation Discipline the Gig Economy? Experimental Evidence from an Online Labor Market
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The Evaluation of Founder Failure and Success by Hiring Firms: A Field Experiment
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The Value of U.S. College Education in Global Labor Markets: Experimental Evidence from China
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Estimating Career Benefits from Online Community Leadership: Evidence from Stack Exchange Moderators
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Too Good to Hire? Capability and Inferences about Commitment in Labor Markets
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Trust and Disintermediation: Evidence from an Online Freelance Marketplace
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All Are Not Equal: An Examination of the Economic Returns to Different Forms of Participation in Open Source Software Communities
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Real-Effort Incentives in Online Labor Markets: Punishments and Rewards for Individuals and Groups
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Continued Voluntary Participation Intention in Firm-Participating Open Source Software Projects
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Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Evidence from Online Labor Markets
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VADER: A Parsimonious Rule-Based Model for Sentiment Analysis of Social Media Text
resolves10.25300/MISQ/2022/17432
Reputation Spillover from Agencies on Online Platforms: Evidence from the Entertainment Industry
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The Screening Role of Design Parameters for Service Procurement Auctions in Online Service Outsourcing Platforms
resolves10.1177/00222429211030841
Communication in the Gig Economy: Buying and Selling in Online Freelance Marketplaces
resolves10.2307/1911029
The Sensitivity of an Empirical Model of Married Women's Hours of Work to Economic and Statistical Assumptions
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Accounting for Endogeneity When Assessing Strategy Performance: Does Entry Mode Choice Affect FDI Survival?
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Optional Verification and Signaling in Online Matching Markets: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
The 35 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedAll that glitters is not gold: The impact of certification costs in online labor markets
no DOI — not checkedIncomplete disclosure: Evidence of signaling and countersignaling
no DOI — not checkedbrms: An R package for Bayesian multilevel models using Stan
no DOI — not checkedManagerial human capital and external mobility: A signaling perspective
no DOI — not checkedSignaling theory: state of the theory and its future
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedIs no news (perceived as) bad news? An experimental investigation of information disclosure
no DOI — not checkedDo microcredentials help new workers enter the market? Evidence from an online labor platform
no DOI — not checkedThe good, the bad, and the unhirable: Recommending job applicants in online labor markets
no DOI — not checkedDesigning the service guarantee: unconditional or specific?
no DOI — not checkedJob search, the duration of unemployment, and the Phillips curve
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedLanding the first job: The value of intermediaries in online hiring
no DOI — not checkedref62
no DOI — not checkedref63
no DOI — not checkedref64
no DOI — not checkedref70
no DOI — not checkedIncomplete disclosure: Evidence of signaling and countersignaling
no DOI — not checkedref80
no DOI — not checkedbrms: An R package for Bayesian multilevel models using Stan
no DOI — not checkedManagerial human capital and external mobility: A signaling perspective
no DOI — not checkedPreference signaling in matching markets
no DOI — not checkedThird party employment branding: Human capital inflows and outflows following "best places to work
no DOI — not checkedref99
no DOI — not checkedThe common structure of statistical models of truncation, sample selection and limited dependent variables and a simple estimator for such models
no DOI — not checkedInformation frictions and skill signaling in the youth labor market
no DOI — not checkedDigital labor markets and global talent flows
no DOI — not checkedDo microcredentials help new workers enter the market? Evidence from an online labor platform
no DOI — not checkedThe good, the bad, and the unhirable: Recommending job applicants in online labor markets
no DOI — not checkedref133
no DOI — not checkedref140
no DOI — not checkedLanding the first job: The value of intermediaries in online hiring
no DOI — not checkedref144
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