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A Theory of Insider Purchases

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3478344
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73/73 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedEfficient Capital Markets: Reply
no DOI — not checkedThe Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns
no DOI — not checkedOn the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets
no DOI — not checkedDoes Stronger Corporate Governance Constrain Insider Trading?
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedThe Accentuated CEO Career Horizon Problem: Evidence From International Acquisitions
no DOI — not checkedDebt and Taxes
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