Reference health
Executive Pay Transparency and Relative Performance Evaluation: Evidence from the 2006 Pay Disclosure Reforms
78/78 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-26
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 78 checked references that resolve
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Executive Compensation, Strategic Competition, and Relative Performance Evaluation: Theory and Evidence
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An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives
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The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans
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Shock-Based Causal Inference in Corporate
Finance and Accounting Research
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The information content of earnings announcements: new insights from intertemporal and cross-sectional behavior
resolves10.1093/jeea/jvab005
Ceo Pay and the Rise of Relative Performance Contracts: A Question of Governance?
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.007
Are all CEOs above average? An empirical analysis of compensation peer groups and pay design
resolves10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.09.006
Why are CEOs paid for good luck? An empirical comparison of explanations for pay-for-luck asymmetry
resolves10.1007/s11142-009-9085-8
Explicit relative performance evaluation in performance-vested equity grants
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00058-0
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.09.003
Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay slice, and firm valuation around the world
resolves10.1017/S0022109019000504
Relative Performance Evaluation in CEO Compensation: A Talent-Retention Explanation
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1982.tb03550.x
Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices
resolves10.1007/s11142-012-9212-9
Relative performance evaluation and peer-performance summarization errors
resolves10.2308/jmar-52580
Implementing Relative Performance Evaluation: The Role of Life Cycle Peers
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb03836.x
Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of Executive Remuneration
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.05.005
Distracted directors: Does board busyness hurt shareholder value?
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2018.08.001
Uncertainty about managers’ reporting objectives and investors’ response to earnings reports: Evidence from the 2006 executive compensation disclosures
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.01.006
Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad
resolves10.2308/accr.00000042
Relative Performance Evaluation and Related Peer Groups in Executive Compensation Contracts
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.01.004
Stock options and managerial incentives for risk taking: Evidence from FAS 123R
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.12.003
Does backdating explain the stock price pattern around executive stock option grants?
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(99)00025-2
Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems
resolves10.1162/003465399558094
Strategic Managerial Incentive Compensation in Japan: Relative Performance Evaluation and Product Market Collusion
resolves10.2308/TAR-2018-0689
Tick Size Tolls: Can a Trading Slowdown Improve Earnings News Discovery?
resolves10.1111/jofi.12393
Behind the Scenes: The Corporate Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors
resolves10.2308/accr-52439
Compensation Consultants and the Level, Composition, and Complexity of CEO Pay
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2020.03.007
CEOs’ outside opportunities and relative performance evaluation: evidence from a natural experiment
resolves10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080154
Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance? Experiments in Low-Income Democracies
resolves10.2308/accr-10033
Determinants of Disclosure Noncompliance and the Effect of the SEC Review: Evidence from the 2006 Mandated Compensation Disclosure Regulations
resolves10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.08.006
Growth through rigidity: An explanation for the rise in CEO pay
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedThe Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedThe Role of Peer Firm Selection in Explicit Relative Performance Awards
no DOI — not checkedref22
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedref51
no DOI — not checkedDoes transparency lead to pay compression
no DOI — not checkedref78
no DOI — not checkedref85
no DOI — not checkedref91
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