Reference health

Efficient Matchmaking in Assignment Games with Application to Online Platforms

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3536086
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15/15 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-15

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

8 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 15 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2018.3265
Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
resolves10.2307/1600403
The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks
resolves10.1016/j.jcss.2003.11.006
An information statistics approach to data stream and communication complexity
resolves10.1007/BF02186476
The auction algorithm: A distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem
resolves10.1137/130938517
Interactive Information Complexity
resolves10.1007/978-3-642-13073-1_33
Communication Requirements for Stable Marriages
resolves10.1257/jep.24.4.187
The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective
resolves10.1086/261411
Multi-Item Auctions
resolves10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
resolves10.1137/1.9781611973730.68
A Stable Marriage Requires Communication
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2797
Competing by Restricting Choice: The Case of Matching Platforms
resolves10.1086/689213
The Effects of Algorithmic Labor Market Recommendations: Evidence from a Field Experiment
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2018.3116
Buyer Uncertainty About Seller Capacity: Causes, Consequences, and a Partial Solution
resolves10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_16
Varying the Number of Signals in Matching Markets
resolves10.1287/opre.2017.1691
Convergence of the Core in Assignment Markets
The 8 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedExpanding "choice" in school choice
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedPreference signaling in matching markets
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedOn random matrices
no DOI — not checkedref14
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref22
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-15 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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