Reference health

Truth-Telling Dominating Strategy: Impossibilities of Shill-Proofness

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3573629
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28/28 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

7 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 28 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/000282803322157061
School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
resolves10.2202/1534-5955.1019
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding
resolves10.1111/1468-0297.00020
The Biggest Auction Ever: The Sale of the British 3G Telecom Licences
resolves10.1007/BF01726210
Multipart pricing of public goods
resolves10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7
Core-selecting package auctions
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1060.0662
Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions
resolves10.1257/aer.97.1.242
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
resolves10.1080/00029890.1962.11989827
College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
resolves10.2307/1914085
Incentives in Teams
resolves10.2307/1911954
Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12351
On the core of auctions with externalities: stability and fairness
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012
The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
resolves10.1257/aer.99.3.608
Incentives and Stability in Large Two-Sided Matching Markets
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2005.02.006
Combinatorial auctions with decreasing marginal utilities
resolves10.1257/aer.20160425
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(83)90048-0
Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
resolves10.1257/aer.103.1.80
School Admissions Reform in Chicago and England: Comparing Mechanisms by their Vulnerability to Manipulation
resolves10.1111/1468-0262.00002
Truncation Strategies in Matching Markets-in Search of Advice for Participants
resolves10.1287/opre.1070.0384
Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical
resolves10.1086/261670
Why Are Vickrey Auctions Rare?
resolves10.1007/s00199-010-0566-6
Optimal shill bidding in the VCG mechanism
resolves10.1006/jeth.1997.2316
Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching Markets
resolves10.1006/jeth.1999.2507
Can Pre-arranged Matches Be Avoided in Two-Sided Matching Markets?
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2019.104970
Obvious manipulations
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.10.002
Position auctions
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x
COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS
resolves10.1017/CCOL0521340446.002
Game-theoretic analyses of trading processes
resolves10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00045-9
The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe lovely but lonely Vickrey auction
no DOI — not checkedStrategy-proofness in the large
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedMarriage, honesty, and stability
no DOI — not checkedHow (not) to sell nuclear weapons
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedReserve price (in) equivalence: Shill bidding to lower the reserve price
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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