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Redistributive Allocation Mechanisms
26/26 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
22 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 26 checked references that resolve
resolves10.3982/ECTA16297
Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2012.02.018
What money canʼt buy: Efficient mechanism design with costly signals
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.008
Market and non-market mechanisms for the optimal allocation of scarce resources
resolves10.1257/aer.97.1.491
Conditional Cash Transfers, Public Provision of Private Goods, and Income Redistribution
resolves10.1093/oxrep/grac034
Reserve system design for allocation of scarce medical resources in a pandemic: some perspectives from the field
resolves10.2307/3003300
Is the Price System or Rationing More Effective in Getting a Commodity to Those Who Need it Most?
The 22 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedAn economic framework for vaccine prioritization
no DOI — not checkedThe Economics of "Tagging" as Applied to the Optimal Income Tax, Welfare Programs, and Manpower Planning
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedBuyers' Welfare Maximizing Auction Design
no DOI — not checkedPublic provision of private goods and the redistribution of income
no DOI — not checkedCash versus kind, self-selection, and efficient transfers
no DOI — not checkedOptimal taxation and public production I: Production efficiency
no DOI — not checkedThe Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
no DOI — not checkedAllocating Scarce Resources in the Presence of Private Information and Bargaining Power
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Design for Redistributions among Endogenous Buyers and Sellers
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedWhy Is So Much Redistribution In-Kind and Not in Cash? Evidence from a Survey Experiment
no DOI — not checkedBidding Rings
no DOI — not checkedMonopoly pricing, optimal randomization, and resale
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedTargeting transfers through restrictions on recipients
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedCovid-19: how to prioritize worse-off populations in allocating safe and effective vaccines
no DOI — not checkedref47
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carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
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