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Consumer Rebates from E-Commerce Platforms and Multi-Channel Management of Third-Party Sellers

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3639717
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34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-17

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

14 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 34 checked references that resolve
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Agency Selling or Reselling? Channel Structures in Electronic Retailing
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x
Competition in two-sided markets
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1120.1626
Managing Strategic Inventories via Manufacturer-to-Consumer Rebates
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2017.2910
Bricks-and-Mortar Entry by Online Retailers in the Presence of Consumer Sales Taxes
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2011.04.006
Customer rebates and retailer incentives in the presence of competition and price discrimination
resolves10.1002/nav.20239
The impact of manufacturer rebates on supply chain profits
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1050.0391
Research Note—Price Discrimination After the Purchase: Rebates as State-Dependent Discounts
resolves10.1111/jems.12305
Platform market competition with endogenous side decisions
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1080.0932
Competition Between Local and Electronic Markets: How the Benefit of Buying Online Depends on Where You Live
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12195
Apple's agency model and the role of most‐favored‐nation clauses
resolves10.1287/mksc.1080.0391
Slippage in Rebate Programs and Present-Biased Preferences
resolves10.25300/MISQ/2014/38.4.04
An Analysis of Pricing Models in the Electronic Book Market1
resolves10.1287/isre.2017.0770
Who Wants Consumers to Be Informed? Facilitating Information Disclosure in a Distribution Channel
resolves10.1287/opre.2017.1642
Optimal Rebate Strategies Under Dynamic Pricing
resolves10.1509/jmkr.47.4.748
Store within a Store
resolves10.1287/mksc.1110.0656
Firm Strategies in the “Mid Tail” of Platform-Based Retailing
resolves10.1093/restud/rdx007
The Agency Model and MFN Clauses
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2020.102581
The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2005.02.041
A joint optimal pricing, rebate value, and lot sizing model
resolves10.25300/MISQ/2017/41.3.05
Platform or Wholesale? A Strategic Tool for Online Retailers to Benefit from Third-Party Information1
resolves10.1287/mksc.1050.0129
Coupons Versus Rebates
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2017.07.002
Who benefit from agency model: A strategic analysis of pricing models in distribution channels of physical books and e-books
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1050.0400
Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory of Information Product Design
resolves10.2307/2555525
Price and Quantity Competition in a Differentiated Duopoly
resolves10.1111/deci.12173
The Agency Model for Digital Goods
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.048
Interactions of competing manufacturers’ leader-follower relationship and sales format on online platforms
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2017.11.011
Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under spillovers from online to offline sales
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2018.09.022
Strategic introduction of the marketplace channel under dual upstream disadvantages in sales efficiency and demand information
resolves10.1016/j.ijpe.2018.07.032
Rebate strategy to stimulate online customer reviews
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2009.12.018
Using MSRP to enhance the ability of rebates to control distribution channels
resolves10.1057/jors.2014.127
Coordinating contracts for supply chains that market with mail-in rebates and retailer promotions
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2019.08.026
Strategic contracting and hybrid use of agency and wholesale contracts in e-commerce platforms
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2015.12.031
The benefits of consumer rebates: A strategy for gray market deterrence
resolves10.1016/j.ejor.2019.07.003
Agency selling or reselling: E-tailer information sharing with supplier offline entry
The 14 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedLinear demand systems for differentiated goods: Overview and user's guide
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What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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