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Accounting for Financial Stability: Bank Disclosure and Loss Recognition in the Financial Crisis

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3644284
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LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP., a Nevada corporation, Plaintiff, v. UKNOWN REGISTRANTS OF www.wn0000.com, www.wn1111.com, www.wn2222.com, www.wn3333.com, www.wn4444.com, www.wn5555.com, www.wn6666.com, www.wn7777.com, www.wn8888.com, www.wn9999.com, www.112211.com, www.4456888.com, www.4489888.com, www.001148.com, and www.2289888.com, Defendants.
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no DOI — not checkedWe use the estimated lifetime losses from the Goldman Sachs Report and the estimated two-year losses from the base scenario in the S&P Report. The estimates cover an average of 88.7% (Goldman Sachs) and 97.8% (S&P) of the loan portfolios of our sample banks and thus provide a lower bound for the total market estimate. The Median estimate (column [I]) represents the median over all available forecasts. Column [J] reports the ratio of the Median Estimate to the Allowance for loan and lease losses (2008-Q4). Column [K] reports the ratio of the Median Estimate to the Total implied loss (2008-Q4). Column [O] reports the ratio of the Median Estimate to the sum of the Net charge-offs from 2009 to 2011. Panel B presents the results of OLS regressions of the recognized loss allowance and the disclosed fair value losses on different proxies for market estimates and reporting incentives for a sample of 237 publicly listed US bank holding companies. The dependent variable in columns (1) to (6) is the ratio of the allowance for loan and lease losses to the gross book value of the loan portfolio (Loss Allowance / Gross Loans). The dependent variable in columns (7) to (12) is the ratio of disclosed fair value losses of the loan portfolio to the portfolio's gross book value (Disclosed Fair Value Loss / Gross Loans)
no DOI — not checked), year and country fixed effects in column (4), and country*year fixed effects in column (5), but do not report the coefficients. We can include country-by-year fixed effects because some banks use local GAAP for regulatory purposes. For these banks, the AFS Result in their IFRS financial statements does not reduce regulatory capital (which is why we code Prudential Filter as 1). The sample comprises all banks using IFRS for financial reporting from 39 countries with available bank-year observations over the
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