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Nudging Enforcers: How Norm Perceptions and Motives for Lying Shape Sanctions

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3664995
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73/73 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

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no DOI — not checkedSample size planning for statistical power and accuracy in parameter estimation
no DOI — not checkedDo people like nudges
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