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Catastrophe Insurance and Solvency Regulation

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3685086
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24/24 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

2 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 24 checked references that resolve
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Robust Optimization
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.05.001
Contract nonperformance risk and uncertainty in insurance markets
resolves10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.09.001
Equilibrium recoveries in insurance markets with limited liability
resolves10.1007/BF01207787
Insurance supply with capacity constraints and endogenous insolvency risk
resolves10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.03.004
Natural catastrophe insurance: How should the government intervene?
resolves10.1080/14697681003685597
Robustness and sensitivity analysis of risk measurement procedures
resolves10.1006/jfin.1996.0205
Price, Financial Quality, and Capital Flows in Insurance Markets
resolves10.1023/A:1025680924004
Optimal Insurance With Divergent Beliefs About Insurer Total Default Risk
resolves10.2307/2937829
Rational Insurance Purchasing: Consideration of Contract Nonperformance
resolves10.1287/opre.2021.2147
Robustness in the Optimization of Risk Measures
resolves10.1111/jori.12021
Optimal Investment and Premium Policies Under Risk Shifting and Solvency Regulation
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00052-6
The market for catastrophe risk: a clinical examination
resolves10.7551/mitpress/2622.001.0001
The Economics of Risk and Time
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(84)90034-5
Investment incentives, debt, and warrants
resolves10.1016/S0193-2306(08)00003-3
Risk Aversion in the Laboratory
resolves10.1093/rfs/hhn021
Nondiversification Traps in Catastrophe Insurance Markets
resolves10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_31
Insurance Market Regulation: Catastrophe Risk, Competition, and Systemic Risk
resolves10.1057/gpp.2012.14
Explaining the Failure to Insure Catastrophic Risks
resolves10.1007/s00780-013-0225-4
Comparative and qualitative robustness for law-invariant risk measures
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2019.01.002
Do you trust your insurer? Ambiguity about contract nonperformance and optimal insurance demand
resolves10.1007/s11238-013-9403-2
Catastrophe insurance equilibrium with correlated claims
resolves10.1023/A:1008733315931
Regulation of Insurance Markets
resolves10.1080/03461238.1986.10413796
Insurance premiums and default risk in mutual insurance
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(02)00141-1
Pricing and capital allocation in catastrophe insurance
The 2 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
no DOI — not checkedref18
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