Reference health
When does Competition and Costly Information Acquisition Lead to a Deadlock?
34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-07-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
24 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 34 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1002/(SICI)1098-2418(199803)12:2<111::AID-RSA1>3.0.CO;2-#
Maximum matchings in sparse random graphs: Karp–Sipser revisited
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2018.3265
Clearing Matching Markets Efficiently: Informative Signals and Match Recommendations
resolves10.1287/opre.2014.1319
Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation
resolves10.1017/S0963548300001796
Perfect Matchings in Random <i>r</i>-regular, <i>s</i>-uniform Hypergraphs
resolves10.1145/3670865.3673511
Costly Capacity Signaling Increases Matching Efficiency: Evidence from a Field Experiment
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2018.3116
Buyer Uncertainty About Seller Capacity: Causes, Consequences, and a Partial Solution
resolves10.1257/aer.89.4.748
The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design
resolves10.1086/262074
Turnaround Time and Bottlenecks in Market Clearing: Decentralized Matching in the Market for Clinical Psychologists
resolves10.1109/TIT.2005.850085
Constructing Free-Energy Approximations and Generalized Belief Propagation Algorithms
resolves10.2753/JEC1086-4415150402
Task Design, Motivation, and Participation in Crowdsourcing Contests
The 24 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedHedging when applying: Simultaneous search with correlation
no DOI — not checkedWhat matters in school choice tie-breaking? how competition guides design
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedPreference signaling in matching markets
no DOI — not checkedExpectations-based loss aversion may help explain seemingly dominated choices in strategy-proof mechanisms
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedSearch frictions and the design of online marketplaces
no DOI — not checkedA revolution: Belief propagation in graphs with cycles
no DOI — not checkedOn the impossibility of informationally efficient markets
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedMarriage, honesty, and stability
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedTractable model of dynamic many-to-many matching
no DOI — not checkedJumping the gun: Imperfections and institutions related to the timing of market transactions
no DOI — not checkedOptimal matchmaking strategy in two-sided marketplaces
no DOI — not checkedRational choice and the structure of the environment
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedref56
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