Reference health

Patent, Screening, Innovation and Welfare

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3697422
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53/53 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-11

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 53 checked references that resolve
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Innovation, Reallocation, and Growth
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Optimal Taxation and R&D Policies
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What percentage of innovations are patented? empirical estimates for European firms
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The value of U.S. patents by owner and patent characteristics
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Sequential innovation, patents, and imitation
resolves10.3386/w13060
Identifying Technology Spillovers and Product Market Rivalry
resolves10.1017/CBO9780511510854
Against Intellectual Monopoly
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.06.002
Patent office in innovation policy: Nobody's perfect
resolves10.2139/ssrn.2367149
What is the Probability of Receiving a US Patent?
resolves10.1162/jeea.2005.3.2-3.724
Live and Let Live: A Tale of Weak Patents
resolves10.3386/w7552
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not)
resolves10.2307/2556077
Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1095810
The Rising Size and Complexity of the Patent Document
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0084.2011.00638.x
On the Price Elasticity of Demand for Patents*
resolves10.1257/aer.98.4.1347
How Strong Are Weak Patents?
resolves10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00513-4
Welfare reducing licensing
resolves10.1162/rest_a_00605
Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents? Evidence from Microlevel Application Data
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.06.007
Market outcomes and dynamic patent buyouts
resolves10.3386/w8807
Post-Issue Patent "Quality Control": A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-examinations and European Patent Oppositions
resolves10.2307/2526504
Patents and R and D: Is There a Lag?
resolves10.1126/science.280.5364.698
Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research
resolves10.1086/510562
Rewarding Sequential Innovators: Prizes, Patents, and Buyouts
resolves10.2139/ssrn.380841
Anticompetitive Settlement of Intellectual Property Disputes
resolves10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00232.x
Patentability, Industry Structure, and Innovation
resolves10.1515/9781400837342
Innovation and Its Discontents
resolves10.2139/ssrn.392202
The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules
resolves10.1086/scr.1966.3108745
Graham v. John Deere Co.: New Standards for Patents
resolves10.1111/joie.12031
Non‐Obviousness and Screening
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00064
Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimations of Patent Value
resolves10.2307/2696401
Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window on Competition
resolves10.31235/osf.io/n3gre
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office
resolves10.1257/0895330054048650
Probabilistic Patents
resolves10.2307/2098683
How Rapidly Does New Industrial Technology Leak Out?
resolves10.1287/mnsc.32.2.173
Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study
resolves10.2307/2555652
The Settlement of Patent Litigation
resolves10.17226/10976
A Patent System for the 21st Century
resolves10.2307/2556088
A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation
resolves10.2307/1912835
Patents as Options: Some Estimates of the Value of Holding European Patent Stocks
resolves10.2307/2555481
Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs
resolves10.2307/2233173
Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European Countries During the Post-1950 Period
resolves10.1111/joie.12029
Inventors and Impostors: An Analysis of Patent Examination with Self‐Selection of Firms into R&D
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12021
Patent quality and incentives at the patent office
resolves10.2307/2555929
Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-Generation Products be Patentable?
resolves10.2307/2556076
On the Optimality of the Patent Renewal System
resolves10.1017/9781316443057.027
Joseph Farrell and Suzanne Scotchmer, “Partnerships” (1988) and Bryan Ellickson, Birgit Grodal, Suzanne Scotchmer, and William R. Zame, “Clubs and the Market” (1999)
resolves10.2307/2555499
Novelty and Disclosure in Patent Law
resolves10.2307/1593724
Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements
resolves10.1016/s1574-0730(07)01004-3
Chapter 4 Litigation
resolves10.1093/qje/qjs032
Market Power Screens Willingness-to-Pay*
The 17 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedUnderstanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedInventing Invention: A Case Study of Legal Innovation
no DOI — not checkedObvious to Whom -Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of PHOSITA
no DOI — not checkedIncentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help
no DOI — not checkedTo Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance Between Competition and Patent Law and Policy
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedBurdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional Guarantees?
no DOI — not checkedUncertainty and the Standard of Patentability
no DOI — not checkedPatent Carrots and Sticks: A Model of Nonobviousness
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedTime to Fix Patents
no DOI — not checkedref67
no DOI — not checkedref68
no DOI — not checkedref69
no DOI — not checkedref70
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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