Reference health
The Fortification Dilemma: Border Control and Rebel Violence
51/51 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
40 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 51 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1086/701492
Crime, Conflict, and the Legitimacy Trade-Off: Explaining Variation in Insurgents’ Participation in Crime
resolves10.1080/09546553.2014.972160
The Battle for Baghdad: Testing Hypotheses About Insurgency From Risk Heterogeneity, Repeat Victimization, and Denial Policing Approaches
resolves10.1177/0022002715596776
Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border Stability
resolves10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00542.x
Who Takes the Blame? The Strategic Effects of Collateral Damage
resolves10.1017/S0003055410000286
International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict
resolves10.1093/isq/sqaa035
Do Walls Work? The Effectiveness of Border Barriers in Containing the Cross-Border Spread of Violent Militancy
resolves10.1177/00220027211066615
Why Do Leaders Build Walls? Domestic Politics, Leader Survival, and The Fortification of Borders
resolves10.1017/S0003055413000403
Explaining Support for Combatants during Wartime: A Survey Experiment in Afghanistan
resolves10.1177/0022343318804594
When do ties bind? Foreign fighters, social embeddedness, and violence against civilians
resolves10.1017/S0003055413000208
Organizing Rebellion: Rethinking High-Risk Mobilization and Social Networks in War
resolves10.1177/0010414020912264
The Power to Resist: Mobilization and the Logic of Terrorist Attacks in Civil War
resolves10.1086/706597
What Explains Taxation by Resource-Rich Rebels? Evidence from the Islamic State in Syria
resolves10.1017/S0020818310000032
The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining: Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars
resolves10.1017/S0003055416000356
Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in Afghanistan
resolves10.1162/016366005774859698
Defeating transnational insurgencies: The best offense is a good fence
resolves10.1016/j.jeconom.2020.09.006
Estimating dynamic treatment effects in event studies with heterogeneous treatment effects
resolves10.1017/S0020818314000204
From Loss to Looting? Battlefield Costs and Rebel Incentives for Violence
resolves10.1177/0022343314563653
From cell phones to conflict? Reflections on the emerging ICT–political conflict research agenda
resolves10.3386/w29170
Visualization, Identification, and Estimation in the Linear Panel Event-Study Design
resolves10.1080/07350015.2016.1227711
Unobservable Selection and Coefficient Stability: Theory and Evidence
resolves10.1177/0022002721991627
The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War
resolves10.1080/14650040701305690
<i>Hakumat al Tayarrat</i> : The Role of Air Power in the Enforcement of Iraq's Boundaries
The 40 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedDo Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedref8
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedA Geospatial Modeling of the Geography of Deterrence
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedMaginot Line or Fort Apache? Using Forts to Shape the Counterinsurgency Battlefield
no DOI — not checkedIranian Strategy in Iraq: Politics and 'Other Means'
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedThe Dynamics of Interstate Boundaries
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedref30
no DOI — not checkedref33
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedHard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience
no DOI — not checkedBorder Orientation in a Globalizing World: Concept and Measurement
no DOI — not checkedref59
no DOI — not checkedTighter Borders Take a Toll In Iraq
no DOI — not checkedref63
no DOI — not checkedref67
no DOI — not checkedThe Strategic Development of Border Areas: Explaining Variation in Interaction Opportunity Across Land Borders
no DOI — not checkedref69
no DOI — not checkedInsurgent Compensation: Evidence from Iraq
no DOI — not checkedA Geospatial Modeling of the Geography of Deterrence
no DOI — not checkedImplementing the Panel Event Study
no DOI — not checkedref75
no DOI — not checkedThe Logic of Suicide Terrorism
no DOI — not checkedref84
no DOI — not checkedref86
no DOI — not checkedref87
no DOI — not checkedref88
no DOI — not checkedref89
no DOI — not checkedref93
no DOI — not checkedIntroducing the worldwide incidents tracking system (WITS)
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
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