Reference health

Efficiency in Repeated Partnerships

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3724923
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43/43 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-11

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

12 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 43 checked references that resolve
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Delay and Deadlines: Freeriding and Information Revelation in Partnerships
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Uncertainty‐driven cooperation
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Two-Sided Learning and the Ratchet Principle
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Signaling with Private Monitoring
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Strategic Trading When Agents Forecast the Forecasts of Others
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Projects and Team Dynamics
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Toward an Economic Theory of Leadership: Leading by Example
resolves10.1016/j.jebo.2005.05.005
Leading for the long term
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Moral Hazard in Teams
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Truthful Equilibria in Dynamic Bayesian Games
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no DOI — not checkedWorking Paper, MIT . P ? eski, Marcin and Juuso Toikka
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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