Reference health

Security Design for Private Acquisitions

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3731086
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57/57 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-02

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

20 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 57 checked references that resolve
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The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedAgreeing to disagree
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no DOI — not checkedRethinking the material adverse change clause in merger and acquisition agreements: Should the united states consider the british model
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no DOI — not checkedFinancial entanglement: A theory of incomplete integration, leverage, crashes, and contagion
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no DOI — not checkedConstrained efficient equilibria in selection markets with continuous types
no DOI — not checkedIncentive schemes, sorting, and behavioral biases of employees: Experimental evidence
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no DOI — not checked2021a, Rent extraction with securities plus cash
no DOI — not checked2021b, Rent extraction with securities plus cash
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no DOI — not checkedA standard clause analysis of the frustration doctrine and the material adverse change clause
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