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Sovereign Bond Restructuring: Commitment vs. Flexibility

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3761293
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35/35 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

22 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 35 checked references that resolve
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Partial Default
resolves10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00075-2
Bond restructuring and moral hazard: are collective action clauses costly?
resolves10.1086/528759
Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00541.x
Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority<sup>1</sup>
resolves10.1093/rof/rft050
Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone
resolves10.1086/261596
A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt
resolves10.1016/j.jinteco.2018.06.004
Foreign-law bonds: Can they reduce sovereign borrowing costs?
resolves10.1093/jla/las004
The Evolution of Contractual Terms in Sovereign Bonds
resolves10.3386/w7531
Can Output Losses Following International Financial Crises be Avoided?
resolves10.1111/jofi.12389
Local Currency Sovereign Risk
resolves10.2307/2296886
Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00208.x
Do Collective Action Clauses Raise Borrowing Costs?
resolves10.1093/jeea/jvac009
Debauchery and Original Sin: The Currency Composition of Sovereign Debt
resolves10.1057/s41308-020-00127-z
Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs
resolves10.1257/00028280260136327
The Household Bankruptcy Decision
resolves10.1257/aer.20151667
The Costs of Sovereign Default: Evidence from Argentina
resolves10.1086/296615
Do Bondholders Lose from Junk Bond Covenant Changes?
resolves10.1017/S002210902300087X
Currency Redenomination Risk
resolves10.5089/9781589061217.054
A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring
resolves10.1093/oso/9780198807230.001.0001
Sovereign Defaults Before Domestic Courts
resolves10.1093/cmlj/kmx042
Exit consents in debt restructurings
resolves10.1093/qje/qjac007
Sovereign Bonds Since Waterloo
resolves10.1257/jel.20211362
Sovereign Debt in the Twenty-first Century
resolves10.1257/jel.47.3.651
The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default
resolves10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1011
The Bond Market's <i>q</i> <sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1093/cmlj/kmz005
The benefits of reducing holdout risk: evidence from the Euro CAC experiment, 2013–2018
resolves10.1093/restud/rdr038
Holdouts in Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Theory of Negotiation in a Weak Contractual Environment
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02426.x
The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt
resolves10.2307/796482
The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts
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The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt
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Will the Sovereign Debt Market Survive?
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The Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law in Constitutional Rights Cases
resolves10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103393
Inflation, default and sovereign debt: The role of denomination and ownership
resolves10.1353/eca.2002.0016
Sovereigns in Distress: Do They Need Bankruptcy?
resolves10.1111/1468-0327.12014
The Greek debt restructuring: an autopsy
The 22 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedref2
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no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedExit consents in sovereign bond exchanges
no DOI — not checkedThe price of law: The case of the Eurozone collective action clauses
no DOI — not checkedref15
no DOI — not checkedSovereign defaults: The price of haircuts
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedThe rise and fall of exit consents
no DOI — not checkedref24
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedCount the limbs: Designing robust aggregate clauses in sovereign bonds
no DOI — not checkedA theory of workouts and the effects of reorganization law
no DOI — not checkedBad news bankers: Evidence from pre-1914 sovereign debt markets on monitor reputation and contagion
no DOI — not checkedref34
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no DOI — not checkedSovereign defaults in court
no DOI — not checkedref53
no DOI — not checkedBond consent solicitation payments
no DOI — not checkedEfficiency and the role of default when security markets are incomplete
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