Reference health
Macroprudential Policy and Elections: What Matters?
54/54 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-25
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
34 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 54 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.91.5.1369
The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1016/s0140-6736(02)84217-9
SEVENTH DAY. Tuesday, March 21, 1837. MEMBERS PRESENT. Cartwright, Mr. Chichester, Mr. Estcourt, Mr. Freemantle, Sir T. Gordon, Mr. R. Graham, Sir J. Harvey, Mr., Hume, Mr. Miles, Mr. Ponsonby, Mr. J. Scrope, Mr. P. Villiers, Mr. C. Walter, Mr., Mr. FAZAKERLEY in the Chair
resolves10.1016/j.jimonfin.2010.02.001
Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence
resolves10.1093/wber/15.1.165
New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions
resolves10.1016/s0304-3878(01)00184-5
Political business cycles, democratization, and economic reform: the case of Africa
resolves10.3386/w22874
Cross-Border Prudential Policy Spillovers: How Much? How Important? Evidence from the International Banking Research Network
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2015.10.004
The use and effectiveness of macroprudential policies: New evidence
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.05.010
What matters for financial development? Capital controls, institutions, and interactions
resolves10.2307/2586015
Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy
resolves10.1177/109114219001800305
The Political Business Cycle and Republican Administrations: an Empirical Investigation
resolves10.1111/1467-9361.00150
Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycle? Evidence from Mexico
resolves10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.01.002
Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2017.01.003
Managing price and financial stability objectives in inflation targeting economies in Asia and the Pacific
resolves10.1023/A:1012895211073
Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces
resolves10.1016/j.jfs.2016.07.014
Can non-interest rate policies stabilize housing markets? Evidence from a panel of 57 economies
resolves10.1057/s41308-017-0048-y
The External Wealth of Nations Revisited: International Financial Integration in the Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis
resolves10.1016/s0176-2680(01)00040-4
Who creates political business cycles: should central banks be blamed?
resolves10.5089/9781498339513.007
The Interaction of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies - Background Paper
resolves10.3386/w21162
Dilemma not Trilemma: The Global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy Independence
resolves10.2139/ssrn.1821904
Political Institutions, State Capabilities and Public Policy: International Evidence
resolves10.1257/aer.102.2.1029
Credit Booms Gone Bust: Monetary Policy, Leverage Cycles, and Financial Crises, 1870–2008
The 34 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
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no DOI — not checkedAssessing the macroeconomic impact of the transition to stronger capital and liquidity requirements
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedMacroprudential Policy: Working Towards A New Consensus Remarks
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedMoving forward with macroprudential framework
no DOI — not checkedMarrying the micro-and macro-prudential dimensions of financial stability
no DOI — not checkedref34
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no DOI — not checkedExchange rate regime, central bank independence, and political business cycles in Brazil
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no DOI — not checkedThe political business cycle: A reexamination of some empirical evidence
no DOI — not checkedElectoral cycles in macroprudential regulation
no DOI — not checkedref64
no DOI — not checkedref66
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no DOI — not checkedref69
no DOI — not checkedThe fiscal footprint of macroprudential policy
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