Reference health

Exaggerating to Break-Even: Reference-Dependent Moral Hazard in Automobile Insurance Claims

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3791275
CiteStamped reference-health badge
16/16 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 16 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1111/jeea.12018
SEPARATING MORAL HAZARD FROM ADVERSE SELECTION AND LEARNING IN AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE: LONGITUDINAL EVIDENCE FROM FRANCE
resolves10.1023/b:reio.0000005630.49071.4a
Moral Hazard and the Market for Used Automobiles
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2014.04.008
Staying ahead and getting even: Risk attitudes of experienced poker players
resolves10.1257/aer.97.1.298
Do Workers Work More if Wages Are High? Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment
resolves10.1111/jeea.12014
LIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
resolves10.1111/jori.12155
Decomposing Asymmetric Information in China's Automobile Insurance Market
resolves10.2202/2153-3792.1082
Testing for Adverse Selection in China's Auto Insurance Market
resolves10.1093/jeea/jvw020
The Limits of Expectations-Based Reference Dependence
resolves10.1257/pol.20150029
Dishonesty and Selection into Public Service: Evidence from India
resolves10.1086/501092
The Effectiveness of State Legislation in Mitigating Moral Hazard: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3511751
Loss Aversion and Property Tax Avoidance
resolves10.1162/qjec.121.4.1133
A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences*
resolves10.1257/aer.p20151036
Deciding When to Quit: Reference-Dependence over Slot Machine Outcomes
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3002907
What Brings a Consumer Back for More? Evidence from Quantifiable Gain and Loss Experiences in Penny Auctions
resolves10.1162/00335530360535144
Does Market Experience Eliminate Market Anomalies?
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2004.00502.x
Neoclassical Theory Versus Prospect Theory: Evidence from the Marketplace
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedInsurance Markets in China
no DOI — not checkedRandomizing Endowments: An Experimental Study of Rational Expectations and Reference-Dependent Preferences
no DOI — not checkedref14
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-27 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3791275"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3791275/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3791275/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3791275)