Reference health

Optimal Dynamic Mechanism under Customer Search

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3804567
CiteStamped reference-health badge
31/31 checkable references clean · checked 2026-09-12

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

20 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 31 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1093/restud/rdv036
Search Deterrence
resolves10.1016/0167-6245(84)90006-4
Regulation and information in a continuing relationship
resolves10.1257/jel.20180892
Dynamic Mechanism Design: An Introduction
resolves10.1016/0165-1765(85)90122-3
Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection
resolves10.1287/mnsc.36.5.555
Optimal Price Skimming by a Monopolist Facing Rational Consumers
resolves10.1287/mnsc.2014.2049
Intertemporal Price Discrimination: Structure and Computation of Optimal Policies
resolves10.1287/opre.2021.2121
Improved Revenue Bounds for Posted-Price and Second-Price Mechanisms
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2006.08.005
Selling options
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2008.00478.x
Durable-Goods Monopoly with Varying Demand
resolves10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199734023.001.0001
An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design
resolves10.1287/moor.2017.0897
Robust Dynamic Pricing with Strategic Customers
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00150
Sequential Screening
resolves10.1111/j.1467-937X.2007.00442.x
Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
resolves10.3982/TE2127
Dynamic contracting: An irrelevance theorem
resolves10.1287/msom.2018.0763
Dynamic Pricing for Heterogeneous Time-Sensitive Customers
resolves10.1287/opre.2013.1194
Optimal Dynamic Mechanism Design and the Virtual-Pivot Mechanism
resolves10.1093/restud/rdq033
Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning
resolves10.1093/restud/rdv003
Optimal Sales Contracts with Withdrawal Rights
resolves10.2307/2555568
Intertemporal Price Discrimination and Sales Strategy under Incomplete Information
resolves10.1287/deca.1110.0228
Exploding Offers
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00386.x
THE ECONOMICS OF JOB SEARCH: A SURVEY
resolves10.1287/opre.2017.1626
Technical Note—Optimal Long-Term Supply Contracts with Asymmetric Demand Information
resolves10.1287/moor.6.1.58
Optimal Auction Design
resolves10.2307/1913154
Multistage Games with Communication
resolves10.3982/ECTA10269
Dynamic Mechanism Design: A Myersonian Approach
resolves10.1214/aop/1176995774
The Finite-Memory Secretary Problem
resolves10.1080/01621459.1975.10479872
A Secretary Problem with Finite Memory
resolves10.2307/1883163
Intertemporal Price Discrimination
resolves10.2307/3214010
A full-information best-choice problem with finite memory
resolves10.1287/mnsc.1090.1034
Ultimatum Deadlines
resolves10.1287/opre.2019.1895
Deadlines, Offer Timing, and the Search for Alternatives
The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedThe scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
no DOI — not checkedref5
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedThe secretary problem and its extensions: A review
no DOI — not checkedSize matters, so does duration: The interplay between offer size and offer deadline
no DOI — not checkedOptimal selling mechanisms with buyer price search
no DOI — not checkedOligopolistic pricing with sequential consumer search
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedwhere the first inequality holds because ? t (u, v [t?1] ) ? ? t?1 (v t?1 ) is decreasing in v 1 , the second equality follows from the stationarity of v t , and the third equality comes from the definition of v 0
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedref44
no DOI — not checkedref45
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedref47
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedref50
no DOI — not checkedref51
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-09-12 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3804567"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3804567/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3804567/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3804567)