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The Interactive Effect of Punishment and Communication on Trust and Reciprocity: An Experimental Examination in a Gift-Exchange Setting

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3805990
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23/23 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-04

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

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The 23 checked references that resolve
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Information system precision and honesty in managerial reporting: A re-examination of information asymmetry effects
resolves10.2307/1885099
Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange
resolves10.2307/2937787
The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment
resolves10.1016/j.aos.2020.101195
The effects of minimum-wage increases on wage offers, wage premiums and employee effort under incomplete contracts
resolves10.1086/383111
Attribution and Reciprocity in an Experimental Labor Market
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x
Promises and Partnership
resolves10.2308/accr-50641
Can Offering a Signing Bonus Motivate Effort? Experimental Evidence of the Moderating Effects of Labor Market Competition
resolves10.2308/jmar-50443
An Experimental Investigation of the Interactions among Intentions, Reciprocity, and Control
resolves10.1111/j.1748-8583.2004.tb00124.x
Organisational communication and supportive employees
resolves10.2307/2118338
Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation
resolves10.1086/209891
When Social Norms Overpower Competition: Gift Exchange in Experimental Labor Markets
resolves10.1162/1542476042782297
The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust and Trustworthiness among Ceos
resolves10.1038/nature01474
Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism
resolves10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
resolves10.1111/1467-6419.00150
Motivation Crowding Theory
resolves10.2307/1912246
An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
resolves10.1086/342894
Partial Gift Exchange in an Experimental Labor Market: Impact of Subject Population Differences, Productivity Differences, and Effort Requests on Behavior
resolves10.2308/accr.2005.80.1.167
The Combined Effect of Wages and Firm Profit on Employee Effort
resolves10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01519.x
COMMUNICATION and FREE‐RIDING BEHAVIOR: THE VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTION MECHANISM
resolves10.2308/accr.2009.84.5.1671
Reciprocity and the Effectiveness of Optimal Agency Contracts
resolves10.1111/j.1911-3846.2010.01050.x
Wage Negotiation, Employee Effort, and Firm Profit under Output‐Based versus Fixed‐Wage Incentive Contracts*
resolves10.1515/9780691215747
A Course in Microeconomic Theory
resolves10.2307/256304
COMMUNICATION WITH EMPLOYEES FOLLOWING A MERGER: A LONGITUDINAL FIELD EXPERIMENT.
The 7 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedFairness and Unemployment
no DOI — not checkedThe grammar of society: The nature and dynamic of social norms
no DOI — not checkedSelection criteria in coordination games: experimental results
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedref27
no DOI — not checkedref28
no DOI — not checkedref30
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