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Stable Matching with Peer-Dependent Preferences in Large Markets: Existence and Cutoff Characterization

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3822060
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30/30 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-20

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

16 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 30 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/000282805774670167
The New York City High School Match
resolves10.1257/aer.20172040
Do Parents Value School Effectiveness?
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School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach
resolves10.1146/annurev-economics-082019-112339
Revealed Preference Analysis of School Choice Models
resolves10.1287/opre.2014.1319
Improving Community Cohesion in School Choice via Correlated-Lottery Implementation
resolves10.1086/687476
A Supply and Demand Framework for Two-Sided Matching Markets
resolves10.3982/TE1060
Walrasian equilibrium in large, quasilinear markets
resolves10.1257/aer.102.5.1773
A Field Study on Matching with Network Externalities
resolves10.1016/j.jmateco.2011.10.008
Many-to-one matching markets with externalities among firms
resolves10.1086/706050
The Indirect Effects of Educational Expansions: Evidence from a Large Enrollment Increase in University Majors
resolves10.1006/jeth.1997.2307
Vacancy Chains and Equilibration in Senior-Level Labor Markets
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2009.07.004
Two-sided matching with interdependent values
resolves10.3982/ECTA13547
Stable Matching in Large Economies
resolves10.1257/aer.101.5.1739
Peer Effects, Teacher Incentives, and the Impact of Tracking: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Kenya
resolves10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.12.001
School choice with neighbors
resolves10.1145/2940716.2940727
Deferred Acceptance with Compensation Chains
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2006.07.003
A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
resolves10.3982/QE592
The superintendent's dilemma: Managing school district capacity as parents vote with their feet
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2016.03.001
Matching with aggregate externalities
resolves10.1145/3033274.3085113
Complementary Inputs and the Existence of Stable Outcomes in Large Trading Networks
resolves10.1162/003355300554719
The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2004.04.006
Stable matchings and preferences of couples
resolves10.1093/qje/qjt019
Matching with Couples: Stability and Incentives in Large Markets*
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02463.x
Inside the Black Box of Ability Peer Effects: Evidence from Variation in the Proportion of Low Achievers In the Classroom
resolves10.3982/ECTA11183
Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2010.05.002
Stable one-to-one matchings with externalities
resolves10.1086/378530
Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and without a Centralized Match
resolves10.3982/ECTA7143
Stability and Preference Alignment in Matching and Coalition Formation
resolves10.1006/jeth.1996.0077
Two-Sided Matching Problems with Externalities
resolves10.1016/j.labeco.2019.04.001
Does it matter when your smartest peers leave your class? Evidence from Hungary
The 16 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedExpanding 'choice' in school choice
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedref9
no DOI — not checkedPeer Preferences, School Competition, and the Effects of Public School Choice
no DOI — not checkedAbility peer effects in university: Evidence from a randomized experiment
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedThe Impact of Neighborhood School Choice: Evidence from Los Angeles' Zones of Choice
no DOI — not checkedDo Peer Preferences Matter in School-Choice Market Design? Theory and Evidence
no DOI — not checkedCompetition between private and public schools, vouchers, and peer-group effects
no DOI — not checkedPairwise stable matching in large economies
no DOI — not checkedMechanisms and impacts of gender peer effects at school
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedGood principals or good peers? Parental valuation of school characteristics, Tiebout equilibrium, and the incentive effects of competition among jurisdictions
no DOI — not checkedOn the uniform convergence of relative frequencies of events to their probabilities
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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