Reference health
A Buyer Power Theory of Exclusive Dealing and Exclusionary Bundling
45/45 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-22
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
26 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 45 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/3087430
The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving Industries
resolves10.1046/j.0013-0133.2003.00178.x
Tying and Innovation: A Dynamic Analysis of Tying Arrangements
resolves10.1257/aer.20171288
Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets
resolves10.2307/2556044
Predatory Accommodation: Below-Cost Pricing without Exclusion in Intermediate Goods Markets
resolves10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00120.x
Downstream mergers and producer's capacity choice: why bake a larger pie when getting a smaller slice?
resolves10.1016/j.jet.2018.06.003
Exclusive dealing and vertical integration in interlocking relationships
resolves10.1007/BF01766400
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
resolves10.2307/2555912
On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation
resolves10.1257/jep.15.2.63
Exclusivity and Tying in <i>U.S. v. Microsoft</i>: What We Know, and Don't Know
The 26 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedContracts as a Barrier to Entry
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedGame-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
no DOI — not checkedref11
no DOI — not checkedref17
no DOI — not checkedA Leverage Theory of Tying in Two-Sided Markets with Non-Negative Price Constraints
no DOI — not checkedLinear Demand Systems for Differentiated Goods: Overview and User's Guide
no DOI — not checkedReport on the Federal Trade Commission Workshop on Slotting Allowances and Other Marketing Practices in the Grocery Industry
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedNetwork Formation and Bargaining in Vertical Markets: The Case of Narrow Networks in Health Insurance
no DOI — not checkedAnalyzing the Welfare Impacts of Full-line Forcing Contracts
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedA General Experiment on Bargaining in Demand Games with Outside Options
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedThe Strategic Value of Quantity Forcing Contracts
no DOI — not checkedThe Competitive Effects of Vertical Agreements: Comment
no DOI — not checkedNaked Exclusion with Private Offers
no DOI — not checkedBargaining, Bundling, and Clout: The Portfolio Effects of Horizontal Mergers
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedNaked Exclusion
no DOI — not checkedThe Logic of Vertical Restraints
no DOI — not checkedEconomics of Vertical Restraints
no DOI — not checkedref61
no DOI — not checkedTying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion
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