Reference health

Cartel Birth and Death Dynamics: Empirical Evidence

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3873351
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33/33 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

24 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 33 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2109879
The Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2006.04.002
The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00170.x
<scp>fines</scp>, <scp>leniency</scp>, and <scp>rewards</scp> in antitrust
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00082.x
Tacit collusion under interest rate fluctuations
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.04.005
Does enforcement deter cartels? A tale of two tails
resolves10.1257/aer.20170116
Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline
resolves10.1007/0-387-28982-8
Inference in Hidden Markov Models
resolves10.1016/0167-7187(91)90023-E
The effects of product differentiation on collusive pricing
resolves10.1086/674011
On the Design of Leniency Programs
resolves10.1007/s10842-006-0028-9
Effectiveness of Antitrust Sanctions on Modern International Cartels
resolves10.2307/2555852
Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee
resolves10.1016/0167-7187(94)90011-6
Collusive pricing in markets for vertically differentiated products
resolves10.1111/joie.12014
Corporate Leniency Programs when Firms have Private Information: The Push of Prosecution and the Pull of Pre‐emption
resolves10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.6.1400
Modeling the Birth and Death of Cartels with an Application to Evaluating Competition Policy
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12359
What Can the Duration of Discovered Cartels Tell Us About the Duration of All Cartels?
resolves10.2307/1911191
Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-R &amp; D Relationship
resolves10.1016/j.irle.2017.11.001
WHEN DO FIRMS LEAVE CARTELS? DETERMINANTS AND THE IMPACT ON CARTEL SURVIVAL
resolves10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00122.x
Through Trial and Error to Collusion*
resolves10.2307/2232832
A Dynamic Analysis of Export Cartels: The Japanese Case
resolves10.1162/003465397556502
Another Look at the Impact of the National Industrial Recovery Act on Cartel Formation and Maintenance Costs
resolves10.2307/1911495
Switching Regression Models with Imperfect Sample Separation Information--With an Application on Cartel Stability
resolves10.1257/002205106776162681
What Determines Cartel Success?
resolves10.1007/s11151-016-9520-5
Price Fixing Hits Home: An Empirical Study of US Price-Fixing Conspiracies
resolves10.1016/j.econlet.2018.01.003
Identification and estimation using heteroscedasticity without instruments: The binary endogenous regressor case
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2021.102710
Determinants of economies of scope in retail
resolves10.1257/aer.99.3.750
Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement
resolves10.1016/S0167-7187(02)00057-7
Leniency programs and cartel prosecution
resolves10.2307/3003634
A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886
resolves10.1016/S0022-1996(98)00009-9
Networks versus markets in international trade
resolves10.1016/0167-7187(92)90043-X
Cartel stability and product differentiation
resolves10.1093/icc/dth075
Cartel contract duration: empirical evidence from inter-war international cartels
resolves10.1111/1467-6451.00164
The Output Effects of Government Sponsored Cartels During the New Deal
resolves10.1287/mksc.1060.0255
Costly Collusion in Differentiated Industries
The 24 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref3
no DOI — not checkedA peak into the swedish cartel register
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedHouse Prices, Stock Returns, National Accounts, and the Riksbank Balance Sheet
no DOI — not checkedThe evolution of Swedish consumer prices 1290-2008
no DOI — not checkedref18
no DOI — not checkedref19
no DOI — not checkedThe anticompetitive effect of minority share acquisitions: Evidence from the introduction of national leniency programs
no DOI — not checkedAn anatomy of cartel contracts
no DOI — not checkedref29
no DOI — not checkedref31
no DOI — not checkedPatents and price fixing by serial colluders
no DOI — not checkedCartel agreements and survival rate
no DOI — not checkedref35
no DOI — not checkedPreventing cartel recidivism
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedref43
no DOI — not checkedLeniency inflation, cartel damages and criminalization
no DOI — not checkedref47
no DOI — not checkedref51
no DOI — not checkedref52
no DOI — not checkedref54
no DOI — not checkedSwedish stock and bond returns, 1856-2012
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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