Reference health
Too Old to Fail
45/45 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-28
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 45 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1016/0378-4266(94)00126-X
Charter value, minimum bank capital requirement and deposit insurance pricing in equilibrium
resolves10.1017/S0022109014000325
Spillover Effects among Financial Institutions: A State-Dependent Sensitivity Value-at-Risk Approach
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.09.013
How does deposit insurance affect bank risk? Evidence from the recent crisis
resolves10.1016/j.jacceco.2010.10.001
The role of information and financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting
resolves10.2307/253732
The Role of Monitoring in Reducing the Moral Hazard Problem Associated with Government Guarantees: Evidence from the Life Insurance Industry
resolves10.1111/jofi.12753
Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance, Risk‐Taking, and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20
<sup>th</sup>
‐Century Banks
resolves10.1016/0304-405X(95)00866-D
Perceptions and the politics of finance: Junk bonds and the regulatory seizure of first capital life
resolves10.1016/S0304-3932(02)00171-X
Does deposit insurance increase banking system stability? An empirical investigation
resolves10.1111/jofi.12042
The Real Effects of Financial Shocks: Evidence from Exogenous Changes in Analyst Coverage
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6296.2012.01217.x
<scp>What Do We Know About Market Discipline in Insurance?</scp>
resolves10.1057/grir.2011.8
Is There Market Discipline in the European Insurance Industry? An Analysis of the German Insurance Market
resolves10.1353/mcb.2006.0081
Market Discipline in Property/Casualty Insurance: Evidence from Premium Growth Surrounding Changes in Financial Strength Ratings
resolves10.1111/j.1540-6261.1989.tb04382.x
Disclosure Decisions by Firms and the Competition for Price Efficiency
resolves10.2307/2601102
Using Market Information in Prudential Bank Supervision: A Review of the U.S. Empirical Evidence
resolves10.1016/S1062-9769(96)90018-6
Response of uninsured depositors to impending S&L failures: Evidence of depositor discipline
resolves10.1093/rof/rft014
The Impact of Public Guarantees on Bank Risk-Taking: Evidence from a Natural Experiment
resolves10.1016/j.jbankfin.2010.11.003
Market discipline, financial crisis and regulatory changes: Evidence from Indonesian banks
resolves10.1111/j.1539-6975.2009.01330.x
<scp>The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance Regulation</scp>
resolves10.1257/aer.90.1.147
Liberalization, Moral Hazard in Banking, and Prudential Regulation: Are Capital Requirements Enough?
resolves10.1111/j.1538-4616.2012.00566.x
Deposit Insurance, Banking Crises, and Market Discipline: Evidence from a Natural Experiment on Deposit Flows and Rates
resolves10.1016/S0304-405X(96)00007-4
Guaranty funds and risk-taking evidence from the insurance industry
resolves10.1016/S0378-4266(99)00013-8
Property–casualty insurance guaranty funds and insurer vulnerability to misfortune
resolves10.1111/0022-1082.00354
Do Depositors Punish Banks for Bad Behavior? Market Discipline, Deposit Insurance, and Banking Crises
resolves10.1016/0378-4266(77)90015-2
An analytic derivation of the cost of deposit insurance and loan guarantees An application of modern option pricing theory
The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref2
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedref10
no DOI — not checkedThe Moral Hazard of Insuring the Insurers
no DOI — not checkedBanks with something to lose: the disciplinary role of the franchise value
no DOI — not checkedMarket Discipline, and Banks' Risk-Taking Incentives under Deposit Insurance
no DOI — not checkedEmerging Risks in the Marketing and Distribution of Life Insurance and Annuities. LIMRA/Milliman Joint Study
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedDeposit insurance, risk, and market power in banking
no DOI — not checkedref46
no DOI — not checkedref56
no DOI — not checkedAdaptive responses to chemical labeling: Are workers Bayesian decision makers?
no DOI — not checkedA Bayesian perspective on biases in risk perception
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this
work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none
carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings,
or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.
checked 2026-08-28 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record
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