Reference health

Hub and Spoke Cartels: Theory and Evidence from the Grocery Industry

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3926934
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42/42 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

25 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 42 checked references that resolve
resolves10.2307/2951764
Tests for Parameter Instability and Structural Change With Unknown Change Point
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.10.002
Testing for collusion in asymmetric first-price auctions
resolves10.1257/aer.100.3.724
A Study of the Internal Organization of a Bidding Cartel
resolves10.1086/705920
Vertical Information Restraints: Pro- and Anticompetitive Impacts of Minimum-Advertised-Price Restrictions
resolves10.1162/003465303772815871
Deciding Between Competition and Collusion
resolves10.1086/260979
The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00093.x
Inference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance
resolves10.1002/jae.2660
Cartel dating
resolves10.1257/aer.20170116
Learning to Coordinate: A Study in Retail Gasoline
resolves10.1093/jleo/ewy011
Bid Rigging and Entry Deterrence in Public Procurement: Evidence from an Investigation into Collusion and Corruption in Quebec
resolves10.1111/joie.12042
The Effect of Explicit Communication on pricing: Evidence from the Collapse of a Gasoline Cartel
resolves10.1007/s11151-018-9649-5
A Structural Break Cartel Screen for Dating and Detecting Collusion
resolves10.1287/mksc.1080.0472
A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2007.tb00043.x
Does Sutton apply to supermarkets?
resolves10.1287/mksc.1080.0398
Supermarket Pricing Strategies
resolves10.1257/aer.91.3.379
Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case
resolves10.1093/qje/qjz019
Uniform Pricing in U.S. Retail Chains*
resolves10.1086/261953
Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild
resolves10.1111/j.0022-1821.2004.00238.x
POST‐CARTEL PRICING DURING LITIGATION
resolves10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00122.x
Resale price maintenance and collusion
resolves10.7551/mitpress/9011.001.0001
The Economics of Collusion
resolves10.1023/A:1007774803225
The Law and Economics of Resale Price Maintenance
resolves10.3982/ECTA13333
Understanding the Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture
resolves10.1257/aer.97.4.1321
Do Vertical Mergers Facilitate Upstream Collusion?
resolves10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.09.003
Vertical integration, raising rivals’ costs and upstream collusion
resolves10.1111/ecoj.12423
Are Supermarkets Squeezing Small Suppliers? Evidence from Negotiated Wholesale Prices
resolves10.1111/1467-937X.00136
A Study of Collusion in First-Price Auctions
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2012.00183.x
Colluding through suppliers
resolves10.2307/2556080
Ohio School Milk Markets: An Analysis of Bidding
resolves10.1080/01621459.1960.10482067
Tests of the Hypothesis That a Linear Regression System Obeys Two Separate Regimes
resolves10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00439.x
RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND INTERLOCKING RELATIONSHIPS<sup>*</sup>
resolves10.1257/000282806776157713
On the Workings of a Cartel: Evidence from the Norwegian Cement Industry
resolves10.1111/j.0008-4085.2004.00001.x
Viewpoint: Canadian competition policy: progress and prospects
resolves10.1093/jeclap/lpu096
Hub-and-Spoke Conspiracies: the Vertical Expression of a Horizontal Desire?
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2016.04.008
A theory of hub-and-spoke collusion
resolves10.2307/2601011
Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices
resolves10.1111/0034-6527.00283
Supermarket Choice and Supermarket Competition in Market Equilibrium
resolves10.1287/mksc.20.3.244.9764
Structural Analysis of Manufacturer Pricing in the Presence of a Strategic Retailer
resolves10.1509/jmkr.43.2.137
Do Slotting Allowances Enhance Efficiency or Hinder Competition?
resolves10.1093/jeclap/lpt082
Hub-and-spoke Collusion: Some Nagging Questions Raised by Economists
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(84)90162-5
Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and bertrand
resolves10.1086/524125
The Economics of Slotting Contracts
The 25 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref1
no DOI — not checkedTrade associations and collusion among many agents: Evidence from physicians
no DOI — not checkedA study of exclusionary coalitions: The canadian sugar combination, 1887-1889
no DOI — not checkedref13
no DOI — not checkedCollusion with asymmetric retailers: Evidence from a gasoline price fixing case
no DOI — not checkedDetecting bidders groups in collusive auctions
no DOI — not checkedref21
no DOI — not checkedref23
no DOI — not checkedReport by Federal Trade Commission staff
no DOI — not checkedref25
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedHub and spoke collusion under imperfect monitoring
no DOI — not checkedDetecting cartels
no DOI — not checkedref33
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedDetecting large-scale collusion in procurement auctions
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedSlotting allowances and scarce shelf space
no DOI — not checkedA supergame-theoretic model of price wars during booms
no DOI — not checkedVertical restraints imposed by buyers: The Secretan copper cartel 1887-1889. forthcoming
no DOI — not checkedHub and spoke collusion by embargo
no DOI — not checkedTacit collusion, cost asymmetries, and mergers
no DOI — not checkedVertical relationships between manufacturers and retailers: Inference with limited data
no DOI — not checkedSlotting contracts and consumer welfare
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

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