Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known
work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction,
withdrawal, or removal notice.
The 92 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1257/aer.104.2.672Raising Retailers’ Profits: On Vertical Practices and the Exclusion of Rivals
resolves10.1093/qje/qjaa003Sequential Bargaining in the Field: Evidence from Millions of Online Bargaining Interactions*
resolves10.2307/1884639Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence
resolves10.1086/379939Differentiated Products Demand Systems from a Combination of Micro and Macro Data: The New Car Market
resolves10.2307/2297815Incomplete Contracts, Vertical Integration, and Supply Assurance
resolves10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00093.xInference on vertical contracts between manufacturers and retailers allowing for nonlinear pricing and resale price maintenance
resolves10.2307/1593786Competition and Market Power in Option Demand Markets
resolves10.1007/s11151-007-9134-zVertical Ownership, Program Network Carriage, and Tier Positioning in Cable Television: An Empirical Study
resolves10.1257/aer.91.3.428Vertical Integration, Market Foreclosure, and Consumer Welfare in the Cable Television Industry
resolves10.1162/003465399558111The Role of Firm Size in Bilateral Bargaining: A Study of the Cable Television Industry
resolves10.1086/700729“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining: A Microfoundation for Applied Work
resolves10.3982/ECTA14031The Welfare Effects of Vertical Integration in Multichannel Television Markets
resolves10.2307/2555608On Governing Multilateral Transactions with Bilateral Contracts
resolves10.1287/mksc.1080.0472A Larger Slice or a Larger Pie? An Empirical Investigation of Bargaining Power in the Distribution Channel
resolves10.2307/1911493An Econometric Analysis of Residential Electric Appliance Holdings and Consumption
resolves10.3982/ECTA16039On the Effect of Parallel Trade on Manufacturers' and Retailers' Profits in the Pharmaceutical Sector
resolves10.1086/429136Dynamic Processes of Social and Economic Interactions: On the Persistence of Inefficiencies
resolves10.1086/705329Transparency and Negotiated Prices: The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining
resolves10.1086/261404The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration
resolves10.1002/jae.896The welfare effects of restricted hospital choice in the US medical care market
resolves10.1257/aer.20171288Equilibrium Provider Networks: Bargaining and Exclusion in Health Care Markets
resolves10.1086/514347Cementing Relationships: Vertical Integration, Foreclosure, Productivity, and Prices
resolves10.1086/691524Estimating the Innovator’s Dilemma: Structural Analysis of Creative Destruction in the Hard Disk Drive Industry, 1981–1998
resolves10.2307/3087440Bargaining, Mergers, and Technology Choice in Bilaterally Oligopolistic Industries
resolves10.2307/796417Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price
resolves10.2307/2555988Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical Results
resolves10.2307/2951674The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
resolves10.2307/3003441Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry
resolves10.2307/1924458Consumer Behavior, Retailer Power and Market Performance in Consumer Goods Industries
resolves10.2307/2555997The Role of Exclusive Territories in Producers' Competition
The 38 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedTomorrow's Antitrust Rulings on Conditional Pricing: How the Lastest Economic Research May Show the Way
no DOI — not checkedNash-in-Nash" tariff bargaining
no DOI — not checkedBundle-size pricing as an approximation to mixed bundling
no DOI — not checkedEfficiency and Foreclosure Effects of Vertical Rebates: Empirical Evidence
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedref38
no DOI — not checkedref42
no DOI — not checkedref44
no DOI — not checkedCompetition, Product Proliferation, and Welfare: A Study of the US Smartphone Market
no DOI — not checkedEmpirical Evidence on Conditional Pricing Practices: A Review
no DOI — not checkedref47
no DOI — not checkedPrice Discrimination and Bargaining: Empirical Evidence from Medical Devices
no DOI — not checkedExclusivity and Control
no DOI — not checkedVertical Bargaining and Countervailing Power
no DOI — not checkedVertical integration and long-term contracts: The case of coal-burning electric generating plants
no DOI — not checkedThe welfare effects of third-degree price discrimination in intermediate good markets
no DOI — not checkedThe efficiency of real-world bargaining: Evidence from wholesale used-auto auctions
no DOI — not checkedref79
no DOI — not checkedref80
no DOI — not checkedOpportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting: Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity
no DOI — not checkedref86
no DOI — not checkedEquilibrium Vertical Foreclosure
no DOI — not checkedVertical Integration: Determinants and Effects
no DOI — not checkedNaked Exclusion
no DOI — not checkedA Primer on Foreclosure
no DOI — not checkedref105
no DOI — not checkedCompetitive Effects of Vertical Integration
no DOI — not checkedref107
no DOI — not checkedRaising Rivals' Costs
no DOI — not checkedOutput and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination
no DOI — not checkedContracts that Reference Rivals
no DOI — not checkedref116
no DOI — not checkedMarket foreclosure and vertical merger: A case study of the vertical merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner
no DOI — not checkedPrice discrimination and social welfare
no DOI — not checkedAntitrust Policy toward Horizontal Mergers
no DOI — not checkedref128
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