Reference health

Industry-optimal Information in the Search Market

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3935299
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15/15 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-21

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

9 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 15 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1006/jeth.1998.2400
Logconcavity versus Logconvexity: A Complete Characterization
resolves10.1093/jeea/jvx017
Ordered Consumer Search
resolves10.1007/s00199-004-0514-4
Log-concave probability and its applications
resolves10.1257/aer.102.2.1140
Search, Design, and Market Structure
resolves10.1086/699211
Competitive Information Disclosure in Search Markets
resolves10.1086/704574
Information Design in the Holdup Problem
resolves10.1111/1756-2171.12411
Consumer search and optimal information
resolves10.1086/701813
The Simple Economics of Optimal Persuasion
resolves10.1257/aer.p20161049
A Rothschild-Stiglitz Approach to Bayesian Persuasion
resolves10.1257/aer.96.3.756
On the Simple Economics of Advertising, Marketing, and Product Design
resolves10.1257/aer.101.6.2590
Bayesian Persuasion
resolves10.3982/TE1805
Optimal information disclosure: A linear programming approach
resolves10.1086/657922
Optimal Information Disclosure
resolves10.2307/1885694
True Monopolistic Competition as a Result of Imperfect Information
resolves10.1016/j.ijindorg.2010.07.001
Ordered search in differentiated markets
The 9 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedPricing, Product Diversity, and Search Costs: A Bertrand-Chamberlin-Diamond Model
no DOI — not checkedConsumer information and the limits to competition
no DOI — not checkedCompetitive Information Disclosure by Multiple Senders
no DOI — not checkedComparison of Experiments
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Information Design for Search Goods
no DOI — not checkedA Simple Model of Search Engine Pricing
no DOI — not checkedref16
no DOI — not checkedref20
no DOI — not checkedBuyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-21 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

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