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Partnership Dissolution with Cash-Constrained Agents

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3939829
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29/29 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-27

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

13 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 29 checked references that resolve
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Efficient partnership dissolution under buy‐sell clauses
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Asymmetric partnerships
resolves10.1007/s00199-010-0540-3
On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
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Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
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A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments
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The Control of Technology Alliances: An Empirical Analysis of the Biotechnology Industry
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Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
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Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers
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The 13 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedImproving Bankruptcy Procedure
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no DOI — not checkedBrave New World of Market Design
no DOI — not checkedRevenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders have Arbitrary Types
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no DOI — not checkedShotguns and Deadlocks
no DOI — not checkedLand Tenure Reforms and Land Conservation Investments in China�C What Does Real Option Value Theory Tell Us?
no DOI — not checkedOptimal Auctions for Asymmetrically Budget Constrained Bidders
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no DOI — not checkedHow to Dissolve a Partnership: Comment
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