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Choosing Less over More Money:The Love of Praiseworthiness and the Dread of Blameworthiness in One-Player Games
34/34 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03
Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.
17 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.
The 34 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1007/s11238-018-9677-5
Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with induced emotions
resolves10.1007/s00199-006-0153-z
Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
resolves10.1257/089533005774357806
Adam Smith's <i>Theory of Moral Sentiments:</i> On Morals and Why They Matter to a Liberal Society of Free People and Free Markets
resolves10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00162-1
Good news for experimenters: subjects do not care about your welfare
resolves10.1016/S1574-0722(07)00046-7
Chapter 46 Reciprocity in Ultimatum and Dictator Games: An Introduction
resolves10.1111/jeea.12006
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
resolves10.1002/bdm.2196
Honest mistake or perhaps not: The role of descriptive and injunctive norms on the magnitude of dishonesty
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2018.01.006
Equilibrium play in voluntary ultimatum games: Beneficence cannot be extorted
The 17 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedMoral distance and moral motivations in dictator games
no DOI — not checkedref4
no DOI — not checkedref6
no DOI — not checkedIntersubjectivity, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Prisoners' Dilemma
no DOI — not checkedGiving in Dictator Games: Experimenter Demand Effect or Preference over the Rules of the Game?
no DOI — not checkedThe cost of price incentives: An empirical analysis of motivation crowding-out
no DOI — not checkedref26
no DOI — not checkedFairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market
no DOI — not checkedref32
no DOI — not checkedref36
no DOI — not checkedref37
no DOI — not checkedThree accounts of intrinsic motivation in economics: a pragmatic choice
no DOI — not checkedBargaining and Market Behavior in Jerusalem
no DOI — not checkedref41
no DOI — not checkedUltimatum game: A Meta-Analysis of the Past Three Decades of Experimental Research
no DOI — not checkedref49
no DOI — not checkedref50
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