Reference health

Procedurally Justifiable Strategies: Integrating Context Effects into Multistage Decision Making

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3982022
CiteStamped reference-health badge
56/56 checkable references clean · checked 2026-08-03

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

20 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 56 checked references that resolve
resolves10.1162/003355300554881
Economics and Identity*
resolves10.2307/2234133
Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving
resolves10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00040-9
Public goods experiments without confidentiality: a glimpse into fund-raising
resolves10.1086/691703
Avoiding the Ask: A Field Experiment on Altruism, Empathy, and Charitable Giving
resolves10.1080/17470218.2012.676055
What is “theory of mind”? Concepts, cognitive processes and individual differences
resolves10.1287/opre.33.1.1
Disappointment in Decision Making Under Uncertainty
resolves10.1006/game.1995.1027
Trust, Reciprocity, and Social History
resolves10.1016/j.socec.2017.11.002
Accounting for context: Separating monetary and (uncertain) social incentives
resolves10.2139/ssrn.3208589
Mine, Ours and Yours? Unintended Framing Effects in Dictator Games
resolves10.1037/h0041006
Postdecision changes in the desirability of alternatives.
resolves10.1007/s11166-013-9179-3
Discriminating among probability weighting functions using adaptive design optimization
resolves10.1162/003355302760193904
Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
resolves10.1111/j.1468-0262.2006.00719.x
Promises and Partnership
resolves10.1023/A:1009994008166
Framing Effects in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.05.007
The role of “Prominent Numbers” in open numerical judgment: Strained decision makers choose from a limited set of accessible numbers
resolves10.1016/j.obhdp.2005.10.001
What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games
resolves10.1162/003355399556151
A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
resolves10.1257/aer.90.4.980
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
resolves10.1016/S1090-5138(04)00005-4
Third-party punishment and social norms
resolves10.1037/h0041593
Cognitive consequences of forced compliance.
resolves10.1111/jeea.12014
LIES IN DISGUISE-AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON CHEATING
resolves10.1111/j.1467-9442.2012.01730.x
The Impact of Social Comparisons on Reciprocity*
resolves10.1006/obhd.2001.2982
The Future Is Now: Temporal Correction in Affective Forecasting
resolves10.1073/pnas.1120893109
Pay-what-you-want, identity, and self-signaling in markets
resolves10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2005.01.002
Nobody's watching?
resolves10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.11.002
Extensive games with possibly unaware players
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2007.07.003
A canonical model for interactive unawareness
resolves10.1126/science.1153808
Antisocial Punishment Across Societies
resolves10.1111/j.1468-036X.2007.00439.x
Non‐Monotonicity of the Tversky‐Kahneman Probability‐Weighting Function: A Cautionary Note
resolves10.1093/cesifo/ifp028
Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow: a Limited Foresight Perspective
resolves10.2307/1914185
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
resolves10.1016/j.cpr.2013.12.003
Reflective functioning: A review
resolves10.1038/nature03701
Oxytocin increases trust in humans
resolves10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1
Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
resolves10.1111/jeea.12006
IDENTIFYING SOCIAL NORMS USING COORDINATION GAMES: WHY DOES DICTATOR GAME SHARING VARY?
resolves10.1177/0956797612450302
The Financial Costs of Sadness
resolves10.1006/redy.1998.0023
Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments
resolves10.1257/aer.90.2.426
Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior
resolves10.1162/003355303322552784
Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility
resolves10.2307/2232669
Regret Theory: An Alternative Theory of Rational Choice Under Uncertainty
resolves10.2307/3038234
Testing for Regret and Disappointment in Choice Under Uncertainty
resolves10.1126/science.2658056
Delay of Gratification in Children
resolves10.1257/aer.89.1.103
Doing It Now or Later
resolves10.1037/0012-1649.26.6.978
Predicting adolescent cognitive and self-regulatory competencies from preschool delay of gratification: Identifying diagnostic conditions.
resolves10.1016/0167-2681(80)90051-7
Toward a positive theory of consumer choice
resolves10.1126/science.185.4157.1124
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
resolves10.1126/science.7455683
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
resolves10.2307/2937956
Loss Aversion in Riskless Choice: A Reference-Dependent Model
resolves10.3982/ECTA7673
Why Do People Keep Their Promises? An Experimental Test of Two Explanations
resolves10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00150-6
Mispredicting the endowment effect:
resolves10.1177/0956797618761661
Revisiting the Marshmallow Test: A Conceptual Replication Investigating Links Between Early Delay of Gratification and Later Outcomes
resolves10.1016/j.joep.2007.04.001
Identity and why we cooperate with those we do
resolves10.1016/j.geb.2010.03.002
Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
resolves10.1006/obhd.1998.2784
Emotional Reactions to the Outcomes of Decisions: The Role of Counterfactual Thought in the Experience of Regret and Disappointment
resolves10.1002/(SICI)1099-0771(199906)12:2<93::AID-BDM311>3.0.CO;2-S
Anticipated regret, expected feedback and behavioral decision making
resolves10.1007/s10683-009-9230-z
Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments
The 20 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedref7
no DOI — not checkedOf tournaments and temptations: An analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry
no DOI — not checkedThe foundations of behavioral economic analysis
no DOI — not checkedShort sight in extensive games
no DOI — not checkedref34
no DOI — not checkedNew challenges to the rationality assumption
no DOI — not checkedref39
no DOI — not checkedref40
no DOI — not checkedExtensive games and the problem of information
no DOI — not checkedref48
no DOI — not checkedThe nature of salience: An experimental investigation of pure coordination games
no DOI — not checkedref55
no DOI — not checkedIncorporating fairness into game theory and economics
no DOI — not checkedref57
no DOI — not checkedHerd behavior and investment
no DOI — not checkedSpieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfragetr�gheit: Teil i: Bestimmung des dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts
no DOI — not checkedThe greatest happiness of the greatest number: The history of Bentham's phrase
no DOI — not checkedref62
no DOI — not checkedEmpathy gaps in emotional perspective taking
no DOI — not checkedref70
What this badge says. CiteStamped means the CHECKABLE references of this work were clean at the dated check: each resolved to a known work in a public registry, and none carried a retraction notice at that time. It says nothing about the quality, findings, or importance of the work itself, and nothing about references deposited without a DOI.

checked 2026-08-03 — re-checked daily as this page is visited; titles and statuses come from Crossref and DataCite and are not part of the signed record

Embed this badge

Both snippets point at the live badge image and link back to this page. The badge re-renders from the daily check, so an embed never goes stale by more than a day of visits.

<a href="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3982022"><img src="https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3982022/badge.svg" alt="CiteStamped reference-health badge" width="460" height="64"></a>
[![CiteStamped reference-health badge](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3982022/badge.svg)](https://citestamp.com/citestamped/10.2139/ssrn.3982022)