Reference health

Bank Ceo Pay-Risk Sensitivity and Loan Contract Terms

https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3991213
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57/57 checkable references clean · checked 2026-10-15

Every reference with a DOI in the deposited reference list resolved to a known work in Crossref or DataCite at the dated check, and none carried a retraction, withdrawal, or removal notice.

3 without a DOI — not checked. A reference deposited without a DOI is never matched by title or guessed at; it stays outside the checked set, and this line discloses that.

The 57 checked references that resolve
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Is stricter regulation of incentive compensation the missing piece?
The 3 references without a DOI — listed, not checked
no DOI — not checkedWhy are commercial loan rates so sticky? The effect of private information on loan spreads
no DOI — not checkedCEO incentive plans and corporate liquidation policy
no DOI — not checkedref48
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